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Articles
WHY WARN?-THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND
RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT IN
BANKRUPTCY
Laura B. Bartell*
INTRODUCTION

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
('WARN") Ace was enacted by Congress in 1988 to provide limited
protections to workers whose jobs are suddenly and permanently
terminated. The WARN Act generally precludes an "employer"
from ordering a "plant closing or mass layoff' until the expiration of
a sixty-day period after giving written notice of such proposed
action! Pursuant to legislative directive,4 the Department of Labor
("Department") promulgated a final rule in 1989 interpreting the
provisions of the statutory language.5 Although neither the WARN
Act itself nor the final rule makes any reference to bankrupt
employers, in the preamble to the rule the Department declined to
exclude bankruptcy "fiduciaries" from the definition of "employer."
*

Associate Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. BA, Stanford

University;J.D., Harvard University.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
2
See infra Part I.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
Id. § 2107(a) (directing the Secretary of Labor to "prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out this chapter... .").
54 Fed. Reg. 16,042 (codified at 20 C.FR. § 639 (2001)).
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Instead the Department suggested that "a fiduciary whose sole
function in the bankruptcy process is to liquidate a failed business
for the benefit of creditors does not succeed to the notice
obligations of the former employer... [but] where the fiduciary
may continue to operate the business for the benefit of creditors,
the fiduciary would succeed to the WARN obligations of the
employer. ,,6
This Article suggests that the distinction made by the
Department rule, as implemented by the bankruptcy courts, is
untenable as a matter of statutory interpretation, legislative history,
and labor and bankruptcy policy. Part I of this Article discusses the
background and language of the WARN Act. Part II looks at the
Department rule and its provisions that might bear on a debtor in
bankruptcy. Part III reviews the cases seeking to apply the WARN
Act and its implementing rule.
Part IV suggests that the
Department's approach of making the WARN Act inapplicable to a
fiduciary for a bankrupt debtor who has the "sole function" of
"liquidat[ing]" the business demonstrates an inadequate grasp of
the bankruptcy process. Although cogent arguments can be made
to support excluding from the WARN Act all employment
terminations ordered in bankruptcy, this Article concludes that the
goals of the WARN Act would be better served by protecting
employees who lose their jobs in bankruptcy to the same extent as
they would be protected outside of bankruptcy and that Congress
should so provide.
I.

ENACTMENT OF THE WARN

ACT

Legislative proposals designed to provide some sort of
protection to workers subject to plant closings and layoffs date back
more than twenty-five years. 7 The bills generally addressed at least
one of three areas.
First, some required advance notice to
Id. at 16,045 (April 20, 1989).
The earliest bills dealing explicitly with this issue were S. 2809, 93d Cong. (1973) and
H.R. 13541, 93d Cong. (1974). Proposed legislation requiring advance notice of plant
closings was introduced in almost every Congress thereafter until the adoption of the WARN
Act in 1988. See H.R. 76, 94th Cong. (1975); H.IL 76, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R 5040, 96th
Cong. (1979); S. 1608, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 1609, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 2847, 98th Cong.
(1983); H.R 6258, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. 1616, 99th Cong. (1985); H.L 4, 100th Cong.
(1987); H.R 1122, 100th Cong. (1987); S.538, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 1420, 100th Cong.
(1987); S.2527, 100th Cong (1988).
6

7
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employees (and in some cases to federal or state officials) before an
employer ordered a plant closing or permanent layoff of employees.
Second, the bills often required consultation between employer and
employees with respect to the proposed plant closing or layoff
before it could be ordered. Finally, they provided for federallyfunded and state-administered programs for worker adjustment
through retraining and income support following a plant closing or
layoff.
None of these proposals generated much support until 1982
when Congress enacted Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act
of 1982 ('jTPA"), which gave states federal funds to aid dislocated
workers through counseling, job placement assistance, and
retraining." Although the Title III programs had some success-a
General Accounting Office report on dislocated workers in 1987
determined that while sixty-nine percent of participants in Title III
programs found new jobs-most dislocated workers received no
assistance at all. By 1985, only seven percent of the dislocated
workers were enrolled in Title III programs.'0
Advance notice and consultation remained even more
contentious issues. In 1985, the House Education and Labor
Committee reported out House Bill 1616, which would have
required employers of fifty or more employees to provide at least
ninety days notice to the affected employees before ordering a
change in operations that could reasonably be expected to result in
an employment loss of fifty or more employees at any site during
any thirty-day period." In addition, the bill would have required
good faith consultation between employer and employees before
ordering the plant closing or layoff. The Republican administration
opposed the bill, and in an effort to defer favorable consideration,
the Secretary of Labor, William E. Brock, appointed a task force to
evaluate the problems associated with plant closings.'2
The
' Pub. L. No. 97-300 (codified at 96 Stat. 1322 (1982)). The JTPA was the first
comprehensive federal program to assist displaced workers since the Manpower Development
and Training Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-415 (codified at 76 Stat. 23 (1962)).
' UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISLOCATED WORKERS: EXEMPLARY
LOCAL PROJECTS UNDER THE JOB TRAINING PARTNERSHIP ACT 8 (April 1987), cited in S. REP.
No. 100-62 (1987).
S. REP. No. 100-62, at 7.
" H. PR REP. No. 99-336,99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985).
1
See Letter from William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor, to Rep. Marge Roukema of New
Jersey, dated Nov. 8, 1985, included in 131 CONG. REc. H10,002, 10,003-04 (1985) (statement
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administration's efforts were successful. Despite amendments on
the floor of the House that reduced the number of employers
covered by the bill, increased the exceptions, eliminated the
consultation provisions,
and limited the remedies available, the bill
13
was narrowly rejected.
The Report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on
Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation 14 was issued in
December 1986. It began by examining the nature and magnitude
of the problem of worker displacement, concluding that, although
displacement is an "inevitable consequence of a dynamic world
economy," it is a problem "of sufficient magnitude and urgency that
it demands an effective coordinated response with special priority by
both the public and private sectors."'5 The Task Force then looked
at how the private and public sectors could meet the challenge of
displacement. It concluded that, with respect to private sector
initiatives, "clear notice in advance, the earlier the better,...
especially... when notice is coupled with no loss of severance
benefits for early leaving and aggressive joint labor-management
outplacement effort" would be the most effective method of
accelerating worker adjustment. 16 With respect to public assistance,
the Task Force concluded, after reviewing the practices in several
other industrialized nations, "that advance notification was a useful
and important first step in providing time for workers to find
alternative employment or training before layoff and in reducing
industry and community reluctance to accept change." 17 Indeed,
the Task Force stated that it was "in agreement with other studies
that have concluded that advance notification is an essential
component of a successful adjustment program." 18 However, the
Task Force could not agree on whether advance notice should be
legislatively mandated or merely voluntary. 9
of Rep. Roukema).
i3 131 CONG. REc. H10,487 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1985). The vote was 203 in favor, 208
against with 23 not voting. Id.
"

U.S. SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER

DISLOCATION, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A COMPETITIVE SOCIETY

(Dec. 1986).
Id. at 16-17.
'
Id. at 18-19.
"
18

'9

Id. at 20.

Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
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Within a year after the report's publication, both the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the House
Committee on Education and Labor reported out a bill intended to
implement the recommendations of the Secretary of Labor's Task
Force.2 ' Both bills proposed to replace Tite III ofJTPA with a new
comprehensive readjustment program for displaced workers to
provide more efficient and more timely delivery of services. Both
bills also required employers to give advance notification of plant
closings and mass layoffs to employees, state government, and local
governmental officials.
Senate Bill 538 was favorably reported by the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources with some modifications and was
included as Part B of Title XXII of the proposed Omnibus Trade
and Competitive Act of 1988.2 In an effort to garner support, some
further changes were made to the provisions of Part B of Title XXII
by Senator Howard Metzenbaum, the sponsor of Senate Bill 538,
reducing the amount of notice required, decreasing the number of
businesses covered, expanding the exceptions and exemptions, and
eliminating any requirement that employers disclose financial
information. 23 An amendment to strike the provisions from the
trade bill failed despite a veto threat from the administration.2 4
Meanwhile, the House passed its own version of the trade bill,
House Bill 3 .25 Because the House Bill did not include the plant
closing prenotification provisions, the Senate amended House Bill 236
to contain the Senate provisions as amended and then passed it.
The House and Senate conferees on House Bill 3 included the
Senate language on plant closings in their report (with some
28
modifications) ,27 and both houses approved the conference report.
.' The Senate Bill was S. 538, 100th Cong. (1988) and the House Bill was H.R. 1122,
100th Cong. (1987). Each was entitled the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
Assistance Act.
21
SeeS. REP. No. 100-62 (1987).
S. 1420, 100th Cong. (1987).
" See 133 CONG. REc. 18,871 (1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
'*
See 133 CONG. REc. 19,142, 19,152 (1987). The vote was 40 in favor of striking the
provisions and 60 against.
See 133 CONG. REc. H2981 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987).
See 133 CONG. REc. S10,372 (daily ed.July 21, 1987).
See H.R REP. NO. 100-576 (1988). A good comparison between the Senate version
and the conference version can be found at 53 Fed. Reg. 36,056, 36,059-63 (September 16,
1988).
See 134 CONG. REc. H2375 (daily ed. April 21, 1988) (House approval by a vote of 312
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As promised, President Reagan vetoed the bill, citing in
particular
the
mandatory
prenotification
provisions
as
2
unacceptable. ' Although the House voted to override the veto,30
the veto was sustained in the Senate.3' Within days a new bill
relating to prenotification of plant closings and layoffs was
introduced in the Senate. 2 Both houses passed the WARN Act less
than a month after its introduction. 3 President Reagan allowed the
bill to become law without his signature on August 4, 1988, and it
became effective six months later. 4
Because of its contentious legislative history, the WARN Act is a
far less ambitious law than many of its supporters might have
wished.
The operative provision, § 2102,s provides that an
"employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the
end of a sixty-day period after the employer serves written notice of
such an order" on the affected employees or their representative
and on state and local government officials.
The key terms used in the provision are all defined.
"Employer" is defined as "any business enterprise that employs...
100 or more employees" who are either not part-time or who in the
aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week exclusive of overtime
(the functional equivalent of 100 full-time workers working fortyhour work-weeks) .36"Plant closing" means
the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of
employment, or one or more facilities or operating units within a

to 107); 134 CONG. REc. 8978 (1988) (Senate approval by a vote of 63 to 36).
" See 134 CONG. REC. 13,529 (1988).
'0 See 134 CONG. REC. 10,152 (1988). The vote was 308 to 113 to override.
31 See 134 CONG. REc. 13,716 (1988). The vote was 61 to 37
to override.
'5 Senate Bill 2527 was introduced on June 16, 1988 and reached the Senate floor on
June 22, 1988. Itwas identical to the plant closing provisions that were included in the vetoed
trade bill. See 134 CONG. REC. 15,514 (1988).
" See 134 CONG. REc. 16,691 (1988) (Senate approval by a vote of 72 to 23); 134 CONG.
REC. H5519 (daily ed.July 13, 1988) (House approval by a vote of 286 to 136).
M SeeWorker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat.
890, § 11 (1988) [hereinafter WARN Act].
,5 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
See id. § 2101 (a) (1). The complete text reads as follows:
(1) the term 'employer' means any business enterprise that employs(A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or
(B) 100 or more employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours
per week (exclusive of overtime).
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single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employment
loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50
or more employees excluding part-time employees.3'
"Mass layoff" is "a reduction in force" other than by a plant closing
which results in employment losses at a single site of employment
during any thirty-day period for at least 500 employees (excluding
part-time employees) or at least fifty employees if they constitute at
least thirty-three percent of all employees at that site. 38 In each case,
if during a ninety-day period there are employment losses for two or
more groups of employees at a single site of employment, each of
which is small enough in number to fall below the statutory
threshold for "plant closing" or "mass layoff" but which together
would qualify, a plant closing or mass layoff is deemed to have
occurred unless the employer demonstrates the employment losses
are the result of "separate and distinct actions and causes and are
not an attempt by the employer to evade the requirements" of the
WARN Act.3 9
"Employment loss" includes not only involuntary termination of
employment but also a layoff exceeding six months or a reduction
of work hours by more than fifty percent each month of a six-month
period.0
The exclusions for part-time employees excluded
employees who worked on average fewer than twenty hours per
week or who were employed for fewer than six of the twelve months
preceding the date prenotification was required.4 '

Seeid.§2101(a)(2).
See id. § 2101 (a) (3). The definition reads in full:
(3) the term 'mass layoff' means a reduction in force which (A) is not the result of a plant closing; and
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any
30-day period for (i) (I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time
employees); and
(II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).

See id.
§ 2102(d).
See id. § 2101(a)(6). "[S]ubject to subsection (b)of this section, the term
.employmentloss' means (A)an employment termination, other than a discharge for cause,
voluntary departure, or retirement, (B) a layoff exceeding 6 months, or (C) a reduction in
hours of work of more than 50 percent during each month of any 6-month period." Id.
' See id. § 2101 (a) (8).
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Provisions limiting the applicability of the WARN Act proved
essential to gaining support for the Act's passage. These limits are
accomplished through three mechanisms. First, the WARN Act
provides that an "employment loss" is not deemed to occur for an
employee if an employer closes a site of employment or lays off the
employee but, prior to the closing or layoff, offers to transfer the
employee to a different site of employment within reasonable
commuting distance with no more than a six-month break in
employment (even if the employee declines) or offers to transfer
the employee to a different site of employment even beyond
reasonable commuting distance with no more than a six-month
break in employment and the employee accepts. 4

2

Congress

believed such situations did not to create a job loss of the type
addressed by the statute.45
Second, the normal sixty-day notification period is not
applicable under three circumstances. The first, familiarly referred
to as the "faltering company" exception," was inserted to address
the concerns of legislators worried that the notice itself would
trigger a business failure that might otherwise have been prevented.
If an employer is required to give sixty-days prior notice of a closing,
that notice itself could scare off potential credit sources, purchasers,
or other business partners whose dealings with the employer might
eliminate the need to engage in a plant closing or layoff, thereby
45
ensuring the employer's failure when silence might have saved it.
The exception was intended, however, to be "a narrow one" and
42

See id. § 2101 (b) (2).

'
See S. REP. No. 100-62, at 23 (1987) (in these cases "in practical terms, no employment
loss will occur despite a closing or layoff.").
44 See, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. 18,877 (1987) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); 134 CONG.

REc. S4718, S 4719, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (daily ed. April 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Adams);
134 CONG. REC. 15,516 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 134 CONG. REc. 15,517 (1988)
(statement of Sen. Chafee and Sen. Metzenbaum); 134 CONG. Rac. 16,103 (1988) (statement
of Sen. Metzenbaum); H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 1048 (1988); see also Roeder v. United
Steelworkers of America (In re Old Electralloy Corp.), 162 B.R. 121, 124 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1993).
'
See, e.g., In re Old Electraflay, 162 B.R. at 124-26; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (b) (1) (1994).
An employer may order the shutdown of a single site of employment before the
conclusion of the 60-day period if as of the time that notice would have been
required the employer was actively seeking capital or business which, if obtained,
would have enabled the employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown and the
employer reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice required
would have precluded the employer from obtaining the needed capital or business.
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requires that the employer prove the specific steps it had taken to
obtain financing or investment or new business that "'would have
enabled the employer' to prevent or forestall the shutdown" and
show the "reasonable basis" for its belief that the required notice
would have prevented the employer from obtaining the funds or
business that it had a "realistic opportunity" to obtain.46
The second circumstance under which a full sixty-day
prenotification is not required is when "the closing or mass layoff is
caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been required. 'A'
Known as the "unforeseeable business circumstances" exception,"
the language was intended to address the situation in which "a
principal client.., suddenly and unexpectedly terminate[d] or
repudiate[d] a major contract" or the employer sees "a sudden,
unexpected and dramatic change in business
conditions such as
49
price, cost, or declines in customer orders.,
Closely related to the second exception is the third, which
excuses notice "if the plant closing or mass layoff is due to any form
of natural disaster, such as a flood, earthquake, or the drought
currently ravaging the farmlands of the United States.'

In all three circumstances that excuse a full sixty-day
prenotification, an employer must give "as much notice as is
practicable" and disclose why the full sixty-day notice was not
provided."
The third way Congress limited the application of the WARN
Act was to provide for two blanket exemptions. The first exemption
renders the provisions inapplicable to closings of temporary
facilities or if the closing or layoff is the result of "the completion of
a particular project or undertaking, and the affected employees
were hired with the understanding that their employment was

SeeH.R CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 1048-49 (1988).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2) (A) (1994).
See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc. 4718, 4719 (1988) (statement of Sen. Adams); 134 CONG.
REc. 15,516, 15,516 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); H.R CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at
1048 (1988).
SH.R CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 1049 (1988). See also 134 CONG. REc. 4718, 4719,
(1988) (statement of Sen. Adams) ("unexpected termination of a major Government
contract"). A business circumstance is not "reasonably foreseeable" unless it is probable that
it will occur. See, e.g., Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 137 F.3d 333,336 (5th Cir. 1998).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B) (1994).
"
Seeid. § 2102(b)(3).

252
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limited to the duration of the facility or the project or
undertaking. , 52
The second exempts a closing or layoff that
"constitutes a strike or constitutes a lockout not intended to evade
53

the requirements of this chapter. ,
If an employer violates its obligation to give prenotification of a
plant closing or mass layoff, the employer is liable to each
"aggrieved employee 5 4 for "back pay for each day of violation" and
benefits for a maximum period of sixty days. 55 The liability is
reduced by "any wages paid by the employer to the employee for the
period of the violation," any other voluntary payments made by the
employer to the employee, or payments by the employer to a third
party or trustee on behalf of the employee for the period of the
violation. 5
The Act gives the court discretion to reduce the
employer's liability if the court believes that the employer's act or
omission "was in good faith and.., the employer had reasonable
grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of"
57
the WARN Act.

II. DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS
Section 8(a) of the WARN Act5 directed the Secretary of Labor
to prescribe regulations necessary to carry out the Act's provisions.
See id.§ 2103(1).
Seeid.§2103(2).
An "aggrieved employee" is defined as "an employee who has worked for the
employer ordering the plant closing or mass layoff and who, as a result of the failure by the
employer to comply with section 2102 of this title [29 U.S.C. § 2102], did not receive timely
notice either directly or through his or her representative as required by section 2102 of this
title." Id. § 2104(a) (7).
See id. § 2104(a) (1). The employer may also be liable to a unit of local government
who fails to receive the required notice for a civil penalty not exceeding $500 for each day of
violation. See id. § 2104(a) (3). In any suit seeking to enforce an employer's obligations, the
prevailing party may be awarded a reasonable attorneys' fee. See id. § 2104(a) (6).
See id.§ 2104(a) (2).
See id. § 2104(a)(4). See, e.g., Kildea v. Electro-Wire Products, Inc., 144 F.3d 400, 409
(6th Cir. 1998); United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 1077 v.
Shadyside Stamping Corp., 947 F.2d 946, 1991 WL 230841 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished);
Roeder v. United Steelworkers of America (In re Old Electralloy Corp.), 162 B.R. 121, 126
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
See Pub. L. No. 100-379, § 8(a), (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (1994)) ("The
Secretary of Labor shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this
chapter. Such regulations shall, at a minimum, include interpretative regulations describing
the methods by which employers may provide for appropriate service of notice as required by
this chapter.").
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On December 2, 1988, the Employment and Training
Administration of the Department published an interim
interpretative rule for the WARN Acte9 and requested comments on
a proposed final rule in identical form which was published on
December 5, 1988.' The final rule was published on April 20,
1989.61

The key provision bearing on the applicability of the WARN Act
is the definition of "employer." Although the statutory definition in
the WARN Act itself focused on the number of employees, it also
described the "employer" as a "business enterprise" employing the
requisite number of employees. 2 "Business enterprise" was not
defined and proved to be the source of many comments on the
proposed rule.
Early commentators asked whether related but legally distinct
entities (e.g., parent and subsidiary corporations or independent
contractors and their business clients) should be considered
independent employers or a single business enterprise; whether
non-profit employers were covered; and whether "public and quasipublic" entities engaged in commercial activities could be
considered "business enterprises." 63 In its proposed final rule, the
Department made clear that it interpreted the term "business
enterprise" to exclude "regular Federal, State, and local government
public services."64 However, that to the extent that public and quasipublic entities engaged in "business" (which the Department
defined as "tak[ing] part in a commercial or industrial enterprise;
supply[ing] a service or good on a mercantile basis; or provid[ing]
independent management of public assets, raising revenue and
making desired investments") and were "managed by a separately
organized governing board with independent authority to manage6
its personnel and assets," they would be subject to the WARN Act. 5
The Department stated, without explanation, that its rule
"include[s] nonprofit organizations." 66 It also included a detailed
See53 Fed. Reg. 48,884 (Dec. 2, 1988).
See53 Fed. Reg. 49,076 (Dec. 5, 1988).
"
54 Fed. Reg. 16,042 (Apr. 20, 1989) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639).
Minor
typographical corrections were subsequently made. See54 Fed. Reg. 18,073 (Apr. 26, 1989).
See29 U.S.C. § 2101 (a) (1) (1994) (quoted in full in note 36).
See53 Fed. Reg. 43,731, 43,732 (October 28, 1988).
See53 Fed. Reg. 49,076, 49,077 (Dec. 5, 1988).
See 53 Fed. Reg. 48,885.
See i&
"
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paragraph in the proposed final rule addressing whether
independent contractors and subsidiaries should be treated as
distinct employers from the contracting company or parent
corporation, itemizing factors to be considered.
When the final rule was published, the Department rejected6
any modification to the substance of its resolution of these issues. 8
But the Department did address for the first time a previously
submitted comment suggesting that "'fiduciaries' in bankruptcy
69
proceedings should be excluded from the definition of employer."
The Department declined to change the rule to address this
concern, noting that "adequate protections for fiduciaries are
available through the bankruptcy courts."70 But the Department
went on to distinguish between "a fiduciary whose sole function in
the bankruptcy process is to liquidate a failed business for the
benefit of creditors" (who, the Department suggested, does not have
any obligation to provide notice under the WARN Act because "the
fiduciary is not operating a 'business enterprise' in the normal
commercial sense") from other fiduciaries who "may continue to
operate the business for the benefit of creditors" and who have
obligations under the WARN Act "precisely
because the fiduciary
71
continues the business in operation."
Although this discussion is the sole reference to bankruptcy in
the preamble to the final rule, and the rule itself does not include
any reference to bankruptcy in its text, other provisions of the rule
and analysis by the Department are directly applicable to financially
troubled employers and might be relevant in determining the
WARN Act's applicability to bankrupt employers. The Department
noted that several comments requested that an exception be
67

See id. at 49,077-78.

Specifically, the Department declined to exclude independent state and local
government agencies that perform business activities entirely from the scope of the WARN
Act, although it added an exclusion for federally recognized Indian tribal governments, and
made explicit its view that in closing banks under the deposit insurance laws the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation exercise
"strictly governmental authority" and are thus not "employers." 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045
(Apr. 20, 1989). It also declined to modify its provision relating to independent contractors
and subsidiaries, suggesting it was "intended only to summarize existing law," and was "not
intended to foreclose any application of existing law or to identify the source of legal
authority for making determinations of whether related entities are separate." Id.
Id. at 16,045.
'

Id.

71

id.

WARN Act
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inserted for "government ordered closings. " 12 Although the
Department declined to include such an exception, it suggested that
"some government-ordered closings may constitute unforeseeable
business circumstances to which reduced notice applies," in
particular "those closings which are the direct result of
governmental action and which occur without notice" such as
"closing of a restaurant by a local health department or the closing3
of a nuclear power plant by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."
It contrasted those circumstances with closings that result from
enforcement action against the employer for violations of safety or
environmental standards that the employer is unable to remedy.
Those closings "may result from a government action" but "are not
government ordered." 74 The key factor bearing on WARN Act
liability in these cases was whether "the employer remains in control
of its business." 75 When, for example, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board orders the closing of a savings and loan institution and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation "assumes control
of the enterprise," ousting former management, no notice76 of
subsequent layoffs need be given because "there is no employer."
In other respects, although the Department deleted a provision
in the proposed final rule stating that the "unforeseeable business
circumstances" excepton77 was to be "narrowly construed" as
unsupported by the legislative history,7 s in fact the final rule
confines the exception to very limited situations, specifically
providing that the circumstance should be "sudden, dramatic, and
unexpected." 79 In such an event, the employer may give less than
the statutory sixty days notice only if the employer reasonably could
not foresee the event, and reasonableness is judged on an objective
7'
73

Id. at 16,054.

74

Id.

Id.

'5 Id.
7' Id. The Department also agreed with the FHLBB that when employees of a closed
institution are rehired to work on winding up its affairs, at which time their jobs will
terminate, they are considered workers on a temporary project who are not entitled to notice
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2103(1) (1994) and 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c) (2001).
See supra text accompanying note 47.
See54 Fed. Reg. at 16,061.
See id. at 16,062; see also 20 C.F.R § 639.9(b) (1) (2001). The phrase is derived from
the Conference Report, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 1049 (1988), where one example of
an unforeseeable business circumstance was described as "a sudden, unexpected and dramatic
change in business conditions, such as price, cost, or declines in customer orders."
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basis, i.e., whether "exercis[ing] such commercially reasonable
business judgment as would a similarly situated employer...
predicting the demands of its particular market" the employer
would have foreseen the event."
The Department listed the
following as likely to constitute unforeseeable business
circumstances: "loss of or failure to award contracts ....changes in
prices and costs, declines in customer orders, ... loss of raw
materials, loss of financing .... [and] court decisions."81 The
Department also suggested, in response to a comment aimed at
persons or institutions acquiring ailing savings and loan institutions,
that there may be circumstances in which "surprise discoveries of
bad debts or assets may require covered employment actions to be
ordered in less than sixty days and where the unforeseeable business
circumstances exception will clearly apply."82
Emphasizing in the final rule that the "faltering company"
exception 83 is to be "narrowly construed, 8 4 the Department listed
four separate elements that must be present to satisfy the exception.
First, the "employer must have been actively seeking capital or
business at the time that 60-day notice would have been required."'
In response to a comment, the Department rejected a broad
reading of this requirement that would have included store-wide
sales aimed at attracting customers, but did agree that "[i]f the store
can show an unusually great effort to attract customers and.., there
was valid reason to believe that the customers would abandon the
store if they knew it would close, the exemption would appear to
apply. ,8 6 Second, "[t]here must have been a realistic opportunity to
obtain the financing or business sought. '8 7 Third, "[t]he financing
or business must have been sufficient, if obtained, to have enabled
the employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown" "for a reasonable

Si

See20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b) (2) (2001).
See 54 Fed. Reg. at 16,062.

82 Id.

See supratext accompanying note 44.
See 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a) (2001).
'5
See id. § 639.9 (a) (1). The rule itemizes various forms this capital or business may take,
including "financing or refinancing through the arrangement of loans, the issuance or stocks,
bonds, or other methods of internally generated financing; or... additional money, credit, or
business through any other commercially reasonable method." Id.
'6

See54 Fed. Reg. at 16,061.
See20 G.F.R § 639.9(a) (2).
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period of time."ss Fourth, the employer must "reasonably and in
good faith... have believed that giving the required notice would
have precluded the employer from obtaining the needed capital or
business. ' 9
With respect to the "natural disaster" exception, ° the
Department listed "[f]loods, earthquakes, droughts, storms, tidal
waves or tsunamis and similar effects of nature" as among the forms
of natural disaster that would qualify under the exception," but
stated that the plant closing or mass layoff must be "a direct result of
a natural disaster" to be excepted. 2
III. APPLYING THE WARN ACT IN BANKRUPTCY
Giving due consideration to the language of the WARN Act and
the additional guidance provided by the Department rule,
bankruptcy courts applying the WARN Act to bankrupt employers
have divided the cases starkly around the temporal line of the
bankruptcy filing.
On the one side are the employers (now debtors) who ordered
a plant closing or mass layoff before the bankruptcy filing. In these
cases the courts have concluded that the obligation to provide
notice was a prefiling obligation, and therefore the "employer"
obligated to give notice could not have been a "fiduciary" whose
failure to do so might be excused under the preamble to the
Department rule. Similarly, the damages owing to employees who
did not receive the obligatory notice are prepetition claims which
may be entitled to priority as prepetition wage claims but are not
administrative expenses.
On the other side are bankrupt employers whose plant closing
or mass layoff commenced after the bankruptcy filing. For them
courts have concluded that WARN Act notice is required unless,
looking at all the facts and circumstances, the bankruptcy court can
Id. § 639.9(a) (3).

Id. § 639.9(a)(4). This factor looks to whether the source of the new capital or
business would be unwilling to provide it to a company whose financial troubles were public
or whose workforce was seeking alternative employment. Id.
See supra text accompanying note 50.
20 C.F.L § 639.9(c)(1) (1994).
Id. § 639.9(c) (2). If the closing or layoff was an indirect consequence of the natural
disaster, the rule suggests that there may be unforeseeable business circumstances excusing
the full sixty days notice. Id. § 639.9(c) (4).
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conclude that the bankruptcy trustee (or the debtor in possession
exercising the powers of the trustee) qualifies as a liquidating
fiduciary. If notice is required, the damages owed to employees who
did not receive notice constitute postpetition administrative expense
claims.
This Part examines the cases falling on each side of the divide
and addresses some of the problems created by the statutory and
regulatory language.
A.

The PrefilingNotification Obligation

Under the WARN Act, the definition of "plant closing" requires
an employment loss for fifty or more employees during any thirtyday period.93 A "mass layoff" also looks at the number of employees
suffering an employment loss over a thirty-day period.94 Although
the determination of whether there has been a plant closing or mass
layoff can be made only by looking backward in time for thirty days
and counting heads, the obligation to provide notice is imposed in
advance; the employer may not order a plant closing or mass layoff
(i.e., begin causing the employment losses that will, thirty days
thereafter, qualify as a plant closing or mass layoff) without
providing the sixty days prior notice. 5 Therefore, once it is
determined that a plant closing or mass layoff within the meaning of
the WARN Act has occurred within a thirty-day period, one can
determine the moment the employer's obligation to provide notice
accrued-sixty days before the first day of that period of
employment losses unless a shorter period is permitted by one of
the exceptions.
If the employer failed to comply with its WARN Act obligation
prior to filing for bankruptcy protection, bankruptcy courts have
had two distinct situations to analyze. The first is when not only the
employer's obligation to give notice accrues prepetition, but the
entire sixty-day period during which the employees would have been
employed had appropriate notice been given occurs prepetition.
Let us take a simple example. Assume we have a troubled
" See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2) (1994). The period may be expanded to 90 days if there
are employment losses for two or more groups at a single site of employment which the
employer fails to demonstrate are separate and distinct actions. See id. § 2102(d).
'
See id. § 2101 (a) (3). This 30-day period is also subject to extension to 90 days. See id.
§ 2102(d).
% See id. § 2102(a).
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corporation called Famico, Inc. which manufactures specialized
computer software and has 150 employees. Famico, without any
precipitating cause that would qualify for the unforeseeable business
circumstances exception and without giving prior notice to its
employees, orders a plant closing or mass layoff, fails to pay the
terminated employees the damages described in the WARN Act, and
files for bankruptcy more than sixty days later. Pursuant to the
WARN Act, Famico is liable to each aggrieved employee, thereby
giving each such employee a "claim" in the company's bankruptcy
case 96 and rendering that employee a "creditor" of Famico." As
such, the employee may file a proof of claim in Famico's bankruptcy
case, 98 and the claim is subject to the same treatment afforded any
other prepetition unsecured claim against Famico's estate."
Alternatively, although the employer's obligation to give notice
may have accrued prepetition (sixty days before the applicable
period of employment loss commenced), the bankruptcy filing may
occur during the sixty-day period. To modify our example, assume
Famico, without giving prior notice to its employees, orders a plant
closing or mass layoff, and files for bankruptcy ten days later without
having paid the terminated employees the damages described in the
WARN Act. In this case, Famico is still not a liquidating fiduciary at
the time its obligation to give notice accrues, even if the subsequent
bankruptcy filing is in chapter 7 or contemplates a liquidating
9

A "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000), includes a "right to

payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured." See, e.g., Snider v. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Commercial Fin. Servs.,
Inc.), 252 B.R 516, 525 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000) ("WARN Act claims against [the debtor],
regardless of the procedural vehicle with which they are asserted, fall unambiguously within
the Bankruptcy Code's definition of 'claim.'").
" A "creditor" includes an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the
time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (10).
' Seeid.§ 501.
In one recent case, In re Blufflon Casting Corp., employees sought to escape their
position as prepetition general unsecured creditors by invoking Indiana state statutes that
provided employees statutory mechanics' liens and employee liens to secure claims for wages.
186 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1999). The employees argued that because the WARN Act
provided them a claim for 60 days of "back pay," they had validly secured that wage claim as
provided by state law and thereby transformed their status to secured creditors. Id. The court
rejected their lien, noting that Congress explicitly provided that the employees' claim for
damages under the WARN Act was the exclusive remedy for any violation of the WARN Act
and precluded the employees from using state statutory liens to secure WARN Act liabilities.
See id. at 860-61. See generally David I. Cisar & Samuel C. Wisotzkey, WARN Act Pre-emption of
State Law Helps Secured Creditors,19 AM. BANKR. INST.J. 10 (2000).
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chapter 11 plan. Therefore, Famico's failure
00 to provide notice is
commentary.1
Department
the
by
not excused
But the status of the employees' claims is less clear. If, ten days
prior to the bankruptcy filing, Famico had given notice that the
actual plant closing or mass layoff would commence sixty days later,
as the WARN Act requires, instead of ordering the plant closing or
mass layoff to commence immediately, the aggrieved employees
would have continued to work for Famico for fifty days after the
bankruptcy case commenced. Thus, their claims for wages for that
period would have constituted administrative expense claims,' °
which are entitled to priority treatment. 0 2 In addition, to the extent
that the WARN Act damages are considered "wages, salaries, or
commissions" earned "within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business,
whichever occurs first," the employees would have a priority claim
for the WARN Act damages with respect to the ten-day period
preceding the filing to the extent of $4,650 for each individual. 3
Therefore, bankruptcy courts have had to grapple with the issue of
whether an employee's WARN Act claims should be afforded the
same priority that such employee's claim for postpetition or
prepetition wages would have been assigned, or whether the
statutory liability under the WARN Act constitutes a prepetition
unsecured obligation without priority.
The argument that WARN Act claims should have the same
priority as the postpetition wages for which they substitute has been
consistently rejected. 1 4 Emphasizing that § 507(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code ("Code") provides a first priority claim only for
wages for services rendered after the commencement of the case,105
one bankruptcy court noted that the WARN Act claimants did not
1WSee,

e.g., Barnett v. Jamesway Corp. (In re Jamesway Corp.), 235 B.R. 329, 343-44
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
'0' Section 503(b) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the allowance of certain
administrative expense claims, including "wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (A) (2000).
" Section 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code affords administrative expense claims
allowed under § 503(b) first priority. Id. § 507(a) (1).
1W Id.§507(a)(3).
See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v. Kitty Hawk Int'l, Inc. (In re Kitty Hawk, Inc.), 255
B.R. 428, 438-39 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000); Barnett v. Jamesway Corp. (In reJamesway Corp.),
235 B.R. 329, 347-48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
'* See I1 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (A) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1) (2000).
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provide any postpetition services to the debtor because the loss of
employment occurred one day before the petition was filed and
therefore could not claim a § 507(a) (1) priority.'

The same bankruptcy court went on to suggest that "[a]t most,
the Union has unsecured claims against the Debtor that are entitled
to a third priority under section 507(a) (3). To the extent the
WARN Claims exceed the dollar limitations for a third priority, the
claims are general unsecured claims against the Debtor.', 0 7 That
analysis is consistent with the approach followed by all other courts
examining the issue of prepetition violations of the WARN Act by
employers who file for bankruptcy protection during the subsequent
sixty-day period. 8
As an exercise in statutory interpretation, this approach is
completely defensible. At the moment the employer orders a plant
closing or mass layoff without giving the mandatory prior
notification, under § 2104(a) (1) of the WARN Act the employer
"shall be liable" to the aggrieved employees.'" This liability creates a
non-contingent claim for damages "for the period of violation, up to
a maximum of 60 days.""0 That claim is not only established by a
prepetition action of the employer (the order to close the plant or
to lay off the workers) but is also measured by looking backward
from the date of that action to determine how many days (out of the
sixty immediately preceding that action) the employees worked

"' See In re Kitty Hawk 255 B.R. at 438. See also In reJamesway, 235 B.R. at 348 ("We have
already determined that Jamesway's obligation to give WARN notice to all plaintiffs arose
[before the bankruptcy petition was filed]. As such, the plaintiffs' damages claims are not
entitled to priority under §§ 503(b) (1) (A) or 507(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code.").
In re Kitty Hawk, 255 B.R. at 438.
'' See, e.g., In reRiker Industries, Inc., 151 B.R. 823, 825-26 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In
re Cargo, 138 B.R 923,926-28 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992); cf In reSher-Del Foods, Inc., 186 B.R.
358, 362 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) (awarding back pay for failure to negotiate under National
Labor Relations Act is "similar to damages under" WARN Act and "Bankruptcy Courts have
accorded wage priority status to damages resulting from violation of this statute").
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1)(1994).
110 Id. Although the intent of Congress with respect to the number of days for which
employees are to receive payments is clear, its language is less than felicitous. The "violation"
of the employer occurs on only one day, the day on which the employer orders the plant
closing or mass layoff without having provided 60 days' prior notification. See id. § 2102(a)
("An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day period
Reading the language of
after the employer serves notice of such an order....").
§ 2104(a) (1) literally, the employees would be entitled to back pay only for the "day of
violation" rather than for the number of days during the period beginning 60 days before the
violation that precede any notice provided as required by the WARN Act.
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without receiving the required sixty days notice,"' also a prepetition
period. As an obligation that has no connection with postpetition
acts of either the employer or the employees, it cannot be
characterized as an administrative expense entitled to first priority
treatment under § 507(b) (1).
However, this interpretation of the Code ignores an important
normative issue.
Should an employer be able to transform
employee wage claims that would, if the employer operated in
accordance with the requirements of the WARN Act, be first priority
administrative expenses into prepetition unsecured claims entitled
to a limited wage priority under § 507(a) (3) through an intentional
violation of the WARN Act? One can certainly argue that Congress
never contemplated that what it structured as a fully-compensatory
remedy"' would be subject to circumvention by the illegal act of the
employer, followed by a bankruptcy filing.
On the other hand, many other legal obligations of a bankrupt
that in the ordinary course would have been paid at face value are,
by virtue of the bankruptcy process, transformed into less valuable
prepetition general unsecured claims. If Famico enters into a
contract providing for payments to be made over time to a creditor
(whether the creditor is a supplier or lender or employee), by
breaching that contract prior to filing for bankruptcy and refusing
to accept further goods or services from the creditor, Famico
transforms what would have been an administrative expense claim
in bankruptcy into a prepetition claim for damages caused by the
breach. Indeed, for some contracts (executory contracts and
unexpired leases) Famico is given the right in bankruptcy to breach
them postpetition, but have that breach treated as if it were a
prepetition default creating a prepetition claim." s All those
creditors have legally enforceable claims, and all are worthy of
I

See id. § 2104(a) (1) (A) (holding employer liable for back pay "for each day of
violation").
. The employee is not only entitled to "back pay for each day of violation at a rate of
compensation not less than the higher of (i) the average regular rate received by such
employee during the last 3 years of the employee's employment; or (ii) the final regular rate
received by such employee" but is also entitled to "benefits under an employee benefit
plan... including the cost of medical expenses incurred during the employment loss which
would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if the employment loss had not
occurred." See id. §§ 2104(a) (1) (A)-(B).
...See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000) (allowing the trustee to reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease) and id. § 502(g) (providing that a claim arising from such a rejection is
treated "the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition").

20021

WARN Act

263

sympathy and economic protection. But the rights of all prepetition
creditors are subject to the operation of the Code which allows
debtors to discharge prepetition debts 1 4 for less than the full
amount owed, subject to compliance with its provisions." 5 When
Congress wished to protect creditors from the effects of bankruptcy,
it did so by excluding their prepetition claims from discharge. 116 If

Congress" wishes to exclude prepetition WARN Act claims from
discharge as well, it can do so. Until then, the characterization of
such claims by the bankruptcy courts seems the correct one.
B.

The PostfilingNotification Obligation

On the other side of the temporal divide is the employer who
files for protection under the Code, and during the pendency of the
bankruptcy case the trustee wishes to close one or more plants or
engage in a mass layoff. Can it do so only in compliance with the
WARN Act, that is, must it provide the affected employees sixty days
prior notice of its action, thereby mandating that the actual
terminations be delayed by as much as sixty days while the
employees continue to collect wages as administrative expenses?
The answer under current law appears to turn on whether the
bankruptcy filing was in chapter 7 or chapter 11 or, more precisely,
whether there is sufficient evidence that the trustee is seeking to
liquidate the debtor's business rather than to operate it for the
benefit of creditors.
As discussed in Part II, the commentary of the Department on
its final rule suggested that "a fiduciary whose sole function in the
bankruptcy process is to liquidate a failed business for the benefit of
creditors... is not operating a 'business enterprise' in the normal
commercial sense""7 and is therefore not an "employer"n 8 subject to
the prenotification obligations of the WARN Act. The Department
contrasted such fiduciaries with those who "may continue to operate
the business for the benefit of creditors" who had to be considered a
.. Only an individual debtor may obtain a discharge of debts in chapter 7. See id.
§ 727(a) (1).
11 For example, in a chapter 11 creditors are protected by the best interests test of 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (ii) (2000) from being required to accept less than those creditors
would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation.
See, e.g., id. § 523.
11
See supratext accompanying notes 69-71.
"
See source cited supranote 36.
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"business enterprise" and thus an "employer" within the meaning of
the WARN Act." 9
The Department commentary has three major textual
deficiencies. First, it demonstrates an inherent confusion between
the "employer" and the representative of the "employer" who
implements its legal obligations.
Second, its treatment of
bankruptcy "fiduciaries" 120 fails to reflect the multiplicity of duties of
a bankruptcy trustee, even in a chapter 7 or chapter 11 liquidation.
Third, the test it proposed is difficult to administer and therefore
unpredictable, costly, and harmful to the employees of chapter 11
debtors.
Even if the WARN Act is found to be applicable to a bankrupt
employer under the Department test, a fourth issue exists - should
the employee claims that arise as a result of a violation of the WARN
Act be treated as first priority administrative expense claims, or
should they be given some other status?
1.

The "Employer"/Representativeof the "Employer"Problem

Part of the Department's treatment of bankruptcy "fiduciaries"
may be attributable to its confusion between the trustee and the
debtor's business that becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Let us
return to our troubled computer software manufacturer Famico,
Inc. Famico is owned by fifty shareholders and has 150 employees.
It has a Board of Directors elected by the shareholders that manages
the corporation.121 It also has corporate officers selected by the
Board to carry out its directives. 22 The "employer" of the 150
employees is Famico, not the directors, not the officers, not the
shareholders. Outside of bankruptcy, WARN Act obligations are

See supra text accompanying note 72.
M "Fiduciary" is not bankruptcy terminology. The term is used in only two sections of
the Code, in the definition of "affiliate" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A)(i) (2000) and in the
exceptions to discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000). The Department probably used the word
because it was used in the comment letter to which it was responding. See supra text
accompanying note 69. Presumably the entity to which the comment was directed was the
trustee in bankruptcy.
12
Management of a corporation is vested in its Board of Directors (or comparable
body) pursuant to the state corporation law under which it is created. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2000); N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 701 (McKinney 2001).
1'
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2000); N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 7 15(g) (McKinney
2001).
1,9
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imposed on Famico, and they are effectuated (as are all other acts of
the corporation) through its officers and directors.
Now assume Famico files for bankruptcy. If the filing is under
chapter 7, an interim trustee Will be appointed by the United States
trustee promptly thereafter,123 who may be replaced by an elected
trustee at the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341 of the
Code. 4 Pursuant to § 323 of the Code, the trustee becomes "the
representative of the estate,""

which the Supreme Court has

analogized to the role played by management of a solvent
corporation.'
The role of the directors is limited to "turn[ing]
over the corporation's property to the trustee and to the
creditors." 127 Thereafter they are "completely ousted" by the
trustee 2 8 and the trustee "assumes control of the business." 2 9 But

the employees of Famico still work for Famico, not for the trustee.
The trustee is the representative of the "employer" who is
responsible for ensuring its compliance with its legal obligations,
but the "employer" remains the debtor corporation. Therefore, the
issue under the WARN Act is not whether the trustee (the
liquidating fiduciary) is an employer, but whether Famico is.
Focusing on Famico, its chapter 7 filing does not result in any
immediate change in its business activities. The employees will
continue to come to work and manufacture and distribute the
computer software pursuant to prepetition contractual orders. Even
under the Department's definition of "business," the activities of
Famico at this stage of the chapter 7 case clearly qualify. When will
Famico cease to engage in a "commercial or industrial enterprise;
supply a service or good on a mercantile basis; or provide
independent management of... assets, raising revenue and making
desired investments"? 30 Only when the trustee actually terminates
Famico's business operations by ceasing production, completing the
sale of any goods (including not only the inventory of software and
its component parts but also any equipment used in manufacturing

'2

See I1 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(1) (2000).

12

Id. § 702(b).
"Id. § 323(a).

See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1985).
1& at 352.
'
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220-21 (1977).
"
Weintraub,471 U.S. at 352.
...53 Fed. Reg. 48,884,48,885 (Dec. 2, 1988).
''
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it which also falls within the definition of "goods"'s), and stops
raising revenue (as by the sale of other assets or the assignment of
contracts32 ) or making investments. Until that time, which occurs
when Famico is actually liquidated, Famico remains a business
enterprise. 3 In other words, although a liquidated debtor is not a
business enterprise, a liquidating debtor is. At some point during
that liquidation process, Famico will cease to be an "employer" not
because it is not a "business enterprise," but because it will
terminate its 150 employees. However, it is nonsensical to suggest
that an act that triggers WARN Act liability for any business
enterprise-the plant closing or mass layoff of employees without
the required notification-is the same act that excuses a chapter 7
debtor from complying with the WARN Act because it divests the
debtor of its status as an "employer.' ' 3 4 It is as if the ultimate
liquidation of these debtors constitutes their ex post facto
exoneration from WARN Act liability during the liquidation process.
The term "business enterprise" used by Congress to impose WARN
Act liability imparts no such exclusion.
Therefore, if the Department had properly focused on the
employer rather than the bankruptcy "fiduciary" (who merely
becomes the representative of the employer) and had looked at the
activities of the bankrupt commercial enterprise, it would have
properly concluded that the business enterprise remains an

l' See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(33) (2000) (defining "equipment" as "goods other than
inventory, farm products, or consumer goods").
" In a chapter 7 case, if the trustee does not act to assume or reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease of personal property of a debtor within sixty days after the order
for relief (or such additional time as the court, for cause fixes), the contract or lease is
deemed rejected. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1) (2000). Even in a chapter 7 case or a liquidating
chapter 11 case a trustee may choose to assume a beneficial executory contract or lease in
order to assign it either to minimize claims against the estate or to generate revenue. See id.
§ 365(f).
'" This conclusion is even more evident when the debtor files under chapter 11 of the
Code rather than chapter 7. Because the chapter 11 trustee (or debtor in possession) is
authorized to operate the debtor's business unless the court orders otherwise, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1108 (2000), the only clear evidence that the trustee has ceased doing so (and thus is no
longer a "business enterprise") is when the chapter 11 debtor is liquidated.
I See Karen Cordry, Missing the Forestfor the Trees, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, *8 (June
2000) (criticizing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of United HealthcareSys., Inc. v. United
Healthcare System, Inc. (In re United Healthcare System, Inc.), 200 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1999),
because it "boils down to saying that once a business shuts down, it is not subject to the WARN
Act. In other words, the precise action that triggers liability-closing abruptly without
compensation-also serves to eliminate that liability").

WARN Act

20021

"employer" until the company ceases to engage in commercial
activity, notwithstanding that the bankruptcy "fiduciary" is
liquidating the company. In most cases that point will be reached
when there are no more employees.
2.

The "SoleFunction"FiduciaryProblem

Even if one reads the Department commentary literally and
focuses on the trustee rather than the debtor employer, there may
be no "fiduciary" in bankruptcy '"vhose sole function" is liquidating
the estate. The duties of trustees in bankruptcy, even in a
liquidating case, extend far beyond mere liquidation. A chapter 7
trustee, whose first duty is to "collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves," 35 has various
other administrative responsibilities in connection with the case. s6
Those duties may, in themselves, constitute doing "business"'"7 and
render the supposed exclusion for bankruptcy fiduciaries
inapplicable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated "the

11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (2000).
Seeid. §§ 704(2)-(9):
The trustee shall ....(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) ensure that the debtor shall perform his intention as specified in section
521(2) (B) of this title;
(4) investigate the financial affairs of the debtor;
(5) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the
allowance of any claim that is improper,
(6) if advisable, oppose the discharge of the debtor;
(7) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the
estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest;
(8) if the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated, file with the court,
with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with
responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such
operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business,
including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as
the United States trustee or the court requires; and
(9) make a final report and file a final account of the administration of the estate
with the court and with the United States trustee.
"' The Department described the concept of doing business as including "tak[ing] part
in a commercial or industrial enterprise; supply[ing] a service or good on a mercantile basis;
or provid[ing] independent management of... assets, raising revenue and making desired
investments." See 53 Fed. Reg. 48,884, 48,885 (Dec. 2, 1988). For example, the entire process
of collecting hard assets and liquidating them involves supplying those assets "on a mercantile
basis" and "raising revenue." Id.
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Bankruptcy Code gives the [chapter 7] trustee wide-ranging
management authority over the debtor," and the trustee "assumes
control of the business.",3
However, even assuming the Department would exclude these
tasks of the trustee from the concept of "operating a 'business
enterprise' in the normal commercial sense," 139 the chapter 7 trustee
may engage in more conventional business activities. For example,
the court has the ability to "authorize the trustee to operate the
business of the debtor for a limited period, if such operation is in
the best interest of the estate and consistent with the orderly
liquidation of the estate.' ' 40 Although the original purpose behind
this provision was to permit the trustee to convert raw materials and
components into finished inventory to increase the value obtainable
upon their sale, 4' it is also used when the value obtainable upon sale
of the business as a going concern exceeds the liquidation value of
the assets. 42 Thus, even what is traditionally considered a chapter 7
liquidation may involve the trustee operating the business,
rendering the bankrupt business a "business enterprise" that should,
under the Department preamble, be subject to the WARN Act
requirements.
Does this distinction make sense from a policy standpoint? In
both situations the ultimate goal of the trustee is to liquidate the
chapter 7 debtor's business, obtaining the highest price possible for
creditors. If the trustee operates the business for a short time, it
does not do so as a "for-profit" entrepreneur; rather, it does so
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985).
54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (April 20, 1989).
140 11 U.S.C. § 721 (2000). A Chapter 7 trustee may not operate the business of the
debtor without court authorization. See, e.g., Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 191 F.2d
726, 728 (9th Cir. 1951); In reRichter, 40 F. Supp. 758, 759-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
14 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5880.
See,
e.g., Goggin, 191 F.2d at 728 (authorizing the completion and sale of unfinished cabinets); In
re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775, 782 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (waiting until fall
round-up to liquidate cattle); Magill v. Springfield Marine Bank (In re Heissinger Resources
Ltd.), 67 B.R. 378, 384 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (operating business to maximize receipts when
business was sold); cf In reA & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 B.R. 144, 147-48 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985)
(refusing to order trustee to operate business of chapter 7 debtor when the trustee would be
required to incur debt or expend personal resources on the estate).
1
See, e.g., In re Heissinger Resources Ltd., 67 B.R. at 384 (continuing to operate
productive oil wells "to maximize receipts when the business was sold"); cf In reA & T Trailer
Park, Inc., 53 B.R. at 147 (noting that § 721 authorization may be given "where it appears that
a business could be sold for a greater price as a going concern than would be obtained in
ordinary liquidation").
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because the sale of the business as a whole will generate a better
return than its dismemberment. To subject the trustee who chooses
to sell the business as a going concern to legal requirements that are
not imposed on the trustee who sells the business asset by asset
ignores the substance of the former transaction-a liquidation. If
the WARN Act does not apply to a liquidating fiduciary, then it
should not apply to a chapter 7 trustee regardless of whether that
trustee chooses to liquidate by selling individual assets or by
operating the business temporarily and selling it as a going concern.
A chapter 11 trustee may have equally complicated obligations.
A chapter 11 trustee performs many (although not all) duties of a
chapter 7 trustee 4 ' in addition to duties imposed solely under
chapter 11.44 Because those duties are unique to the bankruptcy
" Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (1) the chapter 11 trustee is directed to "perform the
duties of a trustee specified in sections 704(2), 704(5), 704(7), 704(8), and 704(9) of this
title." These duties do not include the obligation to liquidate the property of the estate,
ensure performance of the § 521 (1) election, or investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.
See supra note 136. However, the latter two functions are specifically addressed elsewhere. 11
U.S.C. § 1106(2)-(3) (2000).
...Id. §§ 1106(a)(2)-(7):
(a) A trustee shall .... (2) if the debtor has not done so, file the list, schedule, and statement
required under section 521 (1) of this title;
(3) except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, investigate the acts,
conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation
of the debtor's business, the desirability of the continuance of such business,
and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(4) as soon as practicable (A) file a statement of any investigation conducted under paragraph (3)
of this subsection, including any fact ascertained pertaining to fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity
in the management of the affairs of the debtor, or to a cause of action
available to the estate; and
(B) transmit a copy or a summary of any such statement to any creditors'
committee or equity security holders' committee, to any indenture
trustee, and to such other entity as the court designates;
(5) as soon as practicable, file a plan under section 1121 of this title, file a
report of why the trustee will not file a plan, or recommend conversion of the
case to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title or dismissal of the case;
(6) for any year for which the debtor has not filed a tax return required by
law, furnish, without personal liability, such information as may be required by
the governmental unit with which such tax return was to be filed, in light of
the condition of the debtor's books and records and the availability of such
information; and
(7) after confirmation of a plan, file such reports as are necessary or as the
court orders.
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case, were those the only duties a trustee performed, the
Department might not view the trustee as "operating a 'business
enterprise' in the normal commercial sense." 5 But the chapter 11
trustee is also given the power (although not the obligation) to
engage in more conventional business operations. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, "the trustee may operate the debtor's
business." 46 Where the chapter 11 trustee (or the debtor in
possession 47 exercising the powers of the trustee 4 1) chooses to

continue to operate the business, the Department commentary
seems quite clear. It states that if the "fiduciary... continue[s] to
operate the business for the benefit
of creditors," then that
49
fiduciary has WARN Act obligations.

The multiplicity of roles of the trustee in bankruptcy under
chapter 7, as well as under chapter 11, suggests that the Department
inaccurately assumed that the trustee's "sole function" in
bankruptcy is to liquidate the estate. Even if a sole-function
fiduciary exists (the chapter 7 trustee or the liquidating chapter 11
trustee), the applicability of the WARN Act should not turn on
whether the trustee chooses to liquidate the business by sale of
assets or by sale of the going concern. Thus, the Department
commentary makes no sense, even on its own terms.
3.

The Line-DrawingProblem

What if the debtor in possession or the independent trustee
determines NOT to operate the business but decides to liquidate
the business instead? The Department commentary seems to

5 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (April 20, 1989).
11 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000).
1'
The "debtor in possession" is defined to be the "debtor except when a person that has
qualified under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case." Id. § 1101(1).
See id. § 1107(a). The debtor in possession is precluded from performing the duties
146

specified in §§ 1106(a) (2), (3), and (4), and has no right to compensation under § 330. Id.
"' 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (April 20, 1989) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639). The fact
that an independent trustee replaces the debtor in possession "for cause, including fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current
management" or because the trustee's appointment was "in the interests of creditors," 11
U.S.C. §§ 1104(a) (1 )-(2), should not affect the analysis. Such a trustee could be seen as a
successor employer, comparable to an acquiror of the business through a sale or merger. The
WARN Act itself provides that "[a]fter the effective date of the sale of part or all of an
employer's business, the purchaser shall be responsible for providing notice for any plant
closing or mass layoff." 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (b) (1) (1994).
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suggest that if the "sole function" of the debtor in possession or the
independent trustee is "to liquidate a failed business for the benefit
of creditors,"' 50 it is not subject to the WARN Act because it is not
operating a "business enterprise" and is thus not an "employer."' 5'
But how does one ascertain that the chapter 11 trustee has become
such a liquidating fiduciary?
In a chapter 7 case, if the trustee has not been authorized to
operate the business of the debtor,5 2 the Department commentary
suggests that the trustee should be deemed to be engaged in the
sole function of liquidating the estate and is not an employer
subject to WARN Act obligations. Only if the trustee has been
authorized to operate the business is there an issue about whether
the chapter 7 debtor has become a WARN Act employer and thus
must give notice before engaging in a plant closing or mass layoff.
Even if courts were to conclude that a chapter 7 trustee who
operates the debtor's business is not entitled to the exemption
provided by the Department commentary, because the trustee must
obtain authorization to operate the business by court order,' 5
applicability of the WARN Act obligations could turn on the
presence of such a court order, a readily-ascertainable standard.
Chapter 11 provides no such clear lines. As previously
discussed, a chapter 11 trustee is statutorily authorized to operate
the debtor's'business but is not required to do so.5 Presumably, if
(and only if) the trustee chooses to operate the business, the
chapter 11 debtor should be subject to WARN Act obligations as an
employer. Otherwise, the trustee should not qualify as an employer
because the trustee is not operating a business enterprise. But how
do we know what choice the trustee has made at any particular stage
of a bankruptcy case, particularly when no court approval is
required and when the trustee may change his or her mind?

.. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (April 20, 1989) (codified at 20 C.F.R § 639).
. Id. As in chapter 7, because the decision not to operate the business does not relieve
the chapter 11 trustee of its other obligations, one can argue that liquidation is not its "sole
function," and therefore it can not avail itself of the Department commentary.
.. See 11 U.S.C. § 721.
"3 See Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Goggin, 191 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1951); In re
Richter, 40 F. Supp. 758, 759-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
'5' Seell U.S.C. § 1108 (2000). See also In re Airlift Int'l, Inc., 18 B.R. 787, 788-89 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1982); In reThrifty Liquors, Inc., 26 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (declining to
order trustee to operate debtor's business).
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To take an example, assume Famico files for bankruptcy under
chapter 11 and functions as a debtor in possession exercising the
powers of a chapter 11 trustee. After continuing all of its operations
for one month, Famico decides that liquidation will achieve the
highest return for its creditors. At that point Famico may seek to
convert the chapter 11 case to a chapter 7.15 Upon such conversion,
a chapter 7 trustee would be appointed and would clearly fall within
the exclusion for liquidating fiduciaries so long as the trustee does
not obtain court authorization to operate the business. But Famico
believes that values will be higher if Famico conducts the liquidation
itself and chooses to do so in chapter 11256 Famico, therefore,
intends to terminate all its employees. Can it do so without
complying with the WARN Act because it is now a liquidating
fiduciary?
Lacking the clarity of the chapter 7 court order, bankruptcy
courts confronting liquidation under chapter 11 have searched for
other adequate indicia of whether the debtor in possession
continued to operate a business enterprise when it engaged in plant
closings or mass layoffs purportedly pursuant to a chapter 11
liquidation. In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of United
Healthcare System, Inc. v. United Healthcare System, Inc. (In re United
Healthcare System, Inc.), 57 the Third Circuit noted the surrender of
the debtor's certificates of need to the New Jersey Department of
Health immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing and the discharge
or transfer of all patients within two days after the filing. The court
commented that by that time the employees "were no longer
engaged in their regular duties but instead were performing tasks
solely designed to prepare United Healthcare for liquidation."'
Under those circumstances the court found that "United
Healthcare's actions from the time it filed its Chapter 11 petition
throughout the proceedings clearly demonstrated its intent to
"5 A debtor has a right to convert a chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 unless it is not a
debtor in possession, the case was originally commenced as an involuntary case under chapter
11, or the case was converted to chapter 11 other than on the debtor's request. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1112(a)(1)-(3) (2000). A chapter 11 case may be converted to a chapter 7 by the court
upon request of another party in interest "for cause." See id. § 1112(b).
" A chapter 11 plan of reorganization may "provide for the sale of all or substantially all
of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale among holders
of claims or interests." See id. § 1123(b) (4).
...200 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1999).
"7 Id. at 178.
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liquidate;"15' 9 therefore, it was not an "employer" subject to WARN
Act obligations. 60
A similar analysis was suggested by the bankruptcy court in
Bailey v. Jamesway Corp. (In reJamesway Corp.),'6' in which the debtor
argued that its intention to liquidate was evident in various
pleadings it filed with the court and orders it obtained from the
court in the beginning of the case. The court declined to grant
summary judgment with respect to Janesway's status as a liquidating
chapter 11 fiduciary, finding "the extent to which Jamesway
operated its business prior to the time that its employees were
discharged is a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment
as to the 35 employees terminated post-petition."'62 This case
reaffirms the conclusion that each case must be examined on its
own facts, but case-specific factual determinations, requiring judicial
hearings, tend to be costly and time-consuming.
If the application of the concept of liquidating fiduciary is
difficult, expensive, and time-consuming in the United Healthcareand
Jamesway cases-where consistent evidence of the debtor in
possession's intent to liquidate the entire operation was available
early in the case-it becomes even more complicated when the facts
are more ambiguous. For example, does it matter whether the
debtor's operations are continued for two days or two months?
Although that time period may certainly be relevant if the trustee
argues that it always intended liquidation, what happens if the
trustee concedes that it originally intended to operate the business
but its intent changed? Should the trustee's subjective intent even
matter? The Department never looks at the intent of the trustee,
but at its "function in the bankruptcy process." Although the
Department may have intended to focus on statutory functions, it
certainly didn't say so, and, as previously discussed, the statutory
powers of chapter 11 trustees do not resolve the issue.

"9 1d.

"0 Id. at 179. Cf Cain v. Inacomp Corp., 2001 WL 1819997 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)
(concluding that there was a material question of fact whether chapter 11 debtor was
liquidating fiduciary at the time of employee terminations). See generally Gregory G. Hesse,
More from the Labor Law Fron=4 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (April 2000) (discussing United
Healthcareand suggesting that it provides an argument parties can use to reduce WARN Act
liability in a liquidation).
...1997 WL 327105 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
"' Id. at*13.
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What if the chapter 11 trustee liquidates not all of the debtor's
business operations but only the ones affected by the plant closing
or mass layoff? The WARN Act applies to employment losses at a
"single site of employment." 63 With respect to a particular plant
closing or mass layoff in bankruptcy, the chapter 11 trustee may
argue that it has the sole function of liquidating that business for
the benefit of creditors. Although this argument has implicitly been
rejected by one court,'6' why should it matter in applying the
Department language on liquidating fiduciaries whether other
operations conducted by other employees and subject to separate
WARN Act obligations are not being liquidated?
If this argument is rejected and the Department's exception for
the liquidating fiduciary is narrowly confined to those chapter 11
trustees who are liquidating the entire business, when does the
liquidating fiduciary exception attach in the event of a "creeping"
liquidation (in which one portion of the operations is closed down
first, followed by another, and then another)? What evidence is
necessary to establish that a partial liquidation in connection with
operating the business for the benefit of creditors (to which WARN
Act obligations may attach) has turned into a complete liquidation
for their benefit (which is free from the WARN Act)?
Without statutory or regulatory guidance on when a fiduciary
becomes a liquidating fiduciary, bankrupt employers, their
creditors, and employees will be unable to determine whether and
when notice must be given.
Uncertainty invariably leads to
increased cost and delay, two commodities a bankrupt case can illafford. The parties most hurt by that uncertainty tend to be the very
parties the WARN Act was intended to protect, the terminated
employees, because when their right to notice (and payment) is
uncertain, they must pursue their claims through judicial process.'
10
164

See 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (a) (3) (B) (Supp.V 1994).
See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Hanlin Group, Inc. (In re Hanlin Group, Inc.),

176 B.R. 329, 332 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (finding that debtor that laid off employees at West
Virginia plant approximately one month after filing "continued to operate the business as a
whole for the benefit of all parties in interest" and was therefore subject to the WARN Act).
' Because the only sanction for failure to comply with the WARN Act is the payment the
employer would have had to make to the employees had the employer complied, the
bankrupt employer (or its creditors) will always benefit financially from failure to give the
WARN Act notice and terminating employees prior to the sixty days it would otherwise have to
wait. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1) (1994). The debtor will have the use of the money that
would otherwise be paid to employees until such time as the claims asserted by the aggrieved
employees are satisfied. And the employees may not have the knowledge or money to pursue
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The Department regulation necessarily requires these fact-sensitive
determinations and is, therefore, inherently flawed.
4. Priority ofPostpetition WARINAct Claims
If the bankruptcy court concludes that the trustee should have
given WARN Act notice of a postpetition plant closing or mass
layoff, courts have uniformly awarded first priority administrative
expense damages to the employees.'6
However, the statutory
language does not compel that statutory language.
Suppose, as in one of our hypotheticals, the trustee in
bankruptcy for Famico orders a plant closing or mass layoff ten days
after the bankruptcy filing without providing WARN Act notice and
without any statutory exemption. Had the trustee chosen to provide
sixty days prior notice on that tenth day, the employees would have
continued to work for Famico until seventy days after the
bankruptcy filing, and those postpetition wages would clearly have
167
been entitled to a first priority administrative expense claim.
Instead, when the trustee violated the WARN Act, the estate of
Famico became liable to the aggrieved employees for "each day of
violation" during "the period of the violation" up to a maximum of
sixty days.'6 What is the "period of the violation"? If the trustee
orders the plant closing or mass layoff on the tenth day after the
bankruptcy filing, the moment that the WARN Act notice was
required to be given was sixty days prior to that order, that is, the
date that is fifty days priorto bankruptcy in our hypothetical. Under
this analysis, fifty days of the sixty-day "period of the violation"
occurred prepetition, and although the employees are entitled to
administrative expense wages for the ten days they worked
postpetition, damages for the remaining fifty days should be treated
as prepetition claims, subject to possible priority under § 507(a) (3).
But this interpretation of the statute is inconsistent both with
the theory underlying the WARN Act and its legislative history.
WARN Act damages should provide "back pay" 6 9 for a period during
those claims, especially if the debtor (or the benefited creditors) can assert that the employer
was sheltered by the liquidating fiduciary exception.
.. See, eg., In re Beverage Enters., Inc., 225 B.RI 111, 116 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); In re
HanlinGroup, Inc., 176 B.R. at 334.
See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (A) (2000).
S..
3 See29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1) (A) (1994).
'co Id.
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which it is assumed that the employees were not receiving pay in the
first instance because the employer violated the WARN Act. This
suggests that the "period of violation" is not the period commencing
on the date on which the employer should have given notice to
effectuate the ordered employment terminations in compliance
with the WARN Act (in our hypothetical the date which is fifty days
prior to the filing). Instead, it is a period following the ordered
plant closing or mass layoff on which the employees did not have
the opportunity to work with at least sixty days prior notice of the
employment action.
The legislative history supports this
interpretation. 70 In our hypothetical, this would suggest that the
"period of violation" is in fact the sixty days after the ordered plant
closing or mass layoff, all of which occur postpetition.
Even if the appropriate measuring period is postpetition,
arguments have been made that the claims of the terminated
employees should not constitute first priority administrative expense
claims under § 503(b) (1) (A) of the Code. 7 1 The argument has two
prongs. First, it is argued that, although the WARN Act makes a
violating employer liable to the aggrieved employees for "back
pay,"' 72 such back pay does not constitute wages within the meaning
of § 503(b) (1) (A) of the Code. Courts have disagreed, concluding
that the back pay awarded by the WARN Act is comparable to
severance pay in lieu of73 notice and is clearly a component of
employee compensation.

IM
See S. REP.No. 100-62, at 24 (1987) ("damages are to be measured by the wages...
the employee would have received had the plant remained open or the layoff been deferred
until the conclusions [sic] of the notice period"); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 1052
(1988) ("'Violation period' refers to the period of time after a shutdown or layoff in violation
of this Act, and extends for the number of days that notice was required but not given.").
171 Section 503(b) (1) (A) defines the following to be administrative
expenses: "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case...." 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b) (1) (A) (2000).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (1) (A) (1994).
See In re Beverage Enters., Inc., 225 B.R. 111, 116 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers v. Hanlin Group, Inc. (In re Hanlin Group, Inc.), 176 B.R. 329, 333-334
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1995); cf In re Riker Indus., Inc. 151 B.R. 823, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In
re Cargo, 138 B.R. 923, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992) (WARN Act back pay constitutes "'wages'
within the meaning of section 507(a)(3) of the ...Code."); cf Shelby v. Gaddy, 1993 WL
116447 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (WARN Act damages constitute separation payments under
Arkansas unemployment benefits statute.); Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n v. Div. of
Employment Sec., 856 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (WARN Act damages constitute
"vages" rather than "severance pay" under state unemployment benefits statute.). But cf.
Capitol Castings, Inc. v. Ariz. Dept. of Econ. Sec., 828 P.2d 781 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (WARN
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The second prong argues that even if WARN Act back pay
constitutes "wages," they are not wages "for services rendered after
174
commencement of the case" as described in § 503(b) (1) (A). This
argument has been rejected on the theory that the WARN Act
makes the employer liable to the aggrieved employees whenever it
orders a postpetition plant closing or mass layoff without complying
with the notice requirements, and, because the act occurs
postpetition, the "wages" must be earned at the same time. 175 But
the fact that liability for back pay accrues postpetition does not
mean that the wages were "for services rendered after
commencement of the case." 176

Indeed, the employee claims are

expressly measured by a period of time during which the aggrieved
employees rendered no services whatsoever because they were
terminated without proper notice. WARN Act damages simply do
not qualify as wages "for services rendered after commencement of
the case" under § 503(b) (1) (A)177 and judicial legerdemain will not
make them so.
The characterization of WARN Act damages as administrative
expenses is completely sustainable on other grounds. Section
503(a) (1) (A) includes as administrative expenses "the actual,
Those
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.', 7
costs and expenses have consistently been interpreted to include all
"costs ordinarily incident to operation of a business,', 79 including
damages caused by the operation of the debtor's business
postpeition. 8 ° The illegal act of the trustee in bankruptcy (or the
Act damages do not constitute "wages" for purposes of Arizona state unemployment benefits
statute); Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. Bowler (In re Bowler), 147 Or. App. 81, 934 P.2d 1138
(Or. Ct. App. 1997) (WARN Act damages do not constitute "wages" within meaning of WARN
Act or of Oregon workers' compensation law.); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Review, 630 A.2d 948 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (WARN Act damages are not
remuneration under state unemployment benefits statute.); Conrad v. Charles Town Races,
Inc., 521 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1998) (WARN Act damages do not constitute
"wages" within meaning of state wage payment and collection act.).
''
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (A) (2000).
'
See In reHanlin Group, 176 B.R. at 333-34.
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (A).
17
id.
178 Id.

Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471,483 (1968).
See Reading Co., 391 U.S. at 485; Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
116 F.3d 16, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1997); Al Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Texas (In re AI Copeland
Enters., Inc.), 991 F.2d 233, 240 (5th Cir. 1993); Ala. Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining
Co, Inc. (In re N.P. Mining Co., Inc.), 963 F.2d 1449, 1458-1459 (11th Cir. 1992); Spunt v.
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debtor in possession) that gives rise to the employee claims occurs
during the postpetition operation of the debtor's business.
Therefore, those claims should be characterized as "actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate" and should
properly be given first priority administrative claims status."1
IV. WHY (NOT) WARN IN BANKRUPTCY?

As discussed in Part III, application of the WARN Act in
bankruptcy pursuant to the Department rule and its accompanying
preamble turns on two key distinctions. The first is whether the
ordered plant closing or mass layoff occurred prior to the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. 82 The second is whether the entity ordering
the plant closing or mass layoff qualifies as a fiduciary "whose sole
function in the bankruptcy process is to liquidate a failed business
for the benefit of creditors" or is instead one who "continue[s] to
operate the business for the benefit of creditors.", l5 As previously
suggested, the application of these bright line rules is fraught with
interpretative difficulties. This Part suggests that the justification
used by the Department for drawing these distinctions, as well as
other possible rationales for excluding bankrupt employers from
the operation of the WARN Act, are unsupportable as a matter of
statutory interpretation and policy.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

The underlying theory behind both of these distinctions is a
simple one: there is something about a bankruptcy-in particular, a
liquidating bankruptcy-that renders compliance with the
provisions of the WARN Act unnecessary. The justification for this
conclusion by the Department is straightforward. Premise 1: the
'1
WARN Act imposes prenotification obligations on an "employer." 4
Premise 2: an "employer" is defined in the WARN Act as any
"business enterprise. " '85 Premise 3: a liquidating fiduciary (or the
Charlesbank Laundry, Inc. (In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc.), 755 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir.
1985); In reB. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc., 143 B.R. 27, 29-30 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
181 See In re Beverage Enters., 225 B.R. at 117; In re Hanlin Group, 176 B.R. at 334-35.
See supra Part III.
See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (April 20, 1989), and supraPart III.B.
'
See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
IM Seeid. § 2101(a) (1).
8
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Department's analysis. First, as previously discussed, 94 even under
its own interpretation of a "business enterprise" it is difficult to
conclude that a bankrupt employer does not qualify as such, at least
until the moment it actually liquidates its operations. Second, there
is no indication in the WARN Act or in its legislative history that
Congress intended the term "business enterprise" as a limiting term,
designed to exclude employers from the scope of the legislation.
What did Congress mean by the term "business enterprise"?
The phrase, which is not defined in the WARN Act, predates the
enacted statute by many years. It was used in the definition of
"employer" included in many of the plant closing bills introduced in
both houses of Congress during the twenty-five years preceding
enactment of the WARN Act.' 95 Yet the phrase prompted little
Supp. 2000) ("a person or an entity engaged in providing goods or services"); MINN. STAT.
§ 334.011 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1995) ("a commercial or industrial enterprise which is carried
on for the purpose of active or passive investment or profit"); N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 27(10)
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 2001) ("any lawful activity, except a farm operation, conducted
primarily for the purchase, sale, lease and rental of personal and real property, and for the
manufacture, processing, or marketing of products, commodities, or any other personal
property;, for the sale of services to the public; or by a not-for-profit organization"); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 47-6-11 (Michie 1999) ("any activity that is engaged in primarily for the purpose
of generating 'gross income'"); 22 P.R- LAWs ANN. § 10(k)(4) (1999) ("any legal activity
whose principal purpose is: (a) the purchase and sale, manufacture, elaboration or marketing
of products, merchandise or other personal property; or (b) the sale of services to the public;
or (c) for a nonprofit organization").
See supraPart Ill.B.2.
See, e.g., H.R. 1616, 99th Cong. § 2(1) (1985) ("'employer' means any business
enterprise that employs 50 or more employees"); H.R. 1122, 100th Cong. § 1 (1987)
(proposed Section 351(1)), S. 538, 100th Cong. § 201(1) (1988) and S. 1420, 100th Cong.
§ 2202(a) (1987) (proposed Section 331(1)) ('The term 'employer' means any business
enterprise in any State that employs-(A) 50 or more full-time employees; or (B) 50 or more
employees who in the aggregate work at least 2,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of
overtime.)." In H.R. 76, 94th Cong. (1975) and H.R. 76, 94th Cong. § 2 (1975) (proposed
Section 2301(a)), the pre-notification requirement was imposed on any "business concern"
which intended to close or transfer all or part of the operations of a factory, plant or other
single working place of that business concern. "Business concern" was defined as "any
commercial or agricultural business enterprise employing at least fifty employees .... " Id.
(proposed Section 2102(3)). Although H.R 5040,96th Cong. (1979) and S. 1608,96th Cong.
§§ 4(a), 3(4) (1979) continued to impose a pre-notification requirement on certain "business
concerns," id. § 4(a), the term "business concern" was redefined to mean "any person who
directly or indirectly owns a controlling interest in, or controls, a commercial enterprise
which has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $250,000."
Id. § 3(4). The same definition was used in H.R. 2847, 98th Cong. § 103(4) (1983), but
without the annual gross volume of sales limitation. Id. § 103(4). In S. 1609, 96th Cong. §
3(2) (1979), the term "business concern" was defined to mean "any enterprise engaged for
profit in manufacturing, mining, transportation or wholesaling" including parent and
subsidiary corporations together. Id. § 3(2). "Enterprise" was not defined.
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debtor for which it acts) is not a "business enterprise." Conclusion:
a liquidating fiduciary (or such debtor) is not subject to the WARN
Act by process of statutory interpretation.
The problem with this analysis is that Premise 3 has no statutory
basis. Congress did not define "business enterprise," and, as
discussed in Part II,186 its failure to do so gave rise to many of the
comments on the Department's proposed rule. Although the final
rule also did not define "business enterprise," in specifying the
activities of public or quasi-public entities that might subject them to
WARN Act obligations, the Department stated that entities engage
in "business" when they "take part in a commercial or industrial
enterprise; supply a service or good on a mercantile basis; or
provide independent management of public assets, raising revenue
and making desired investments."1 7 By utilizing this definition of

"business" the Department expressed its view that "regular Federal,
State, and local government public services" were to be excluded
from the WARN Act, " as were liquidating bankruptcy fiduciaries, 8 9
but not nonprofit organizations.' 90
The term "business" has no accepted legal definition.' 9' And
there is nothing inherently irrational about the factors the
Department proposed to determine whether "business" is taking
place. Indeed, support for many of these factors can be found in
case law, 9 2 and statutory definitions. 9 3 But there are two flaws in the
See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
53 Fed. Reg. 48,884, 48,885 (Dec. 2, 1988) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a) (1)).
m See53 Fed. Reg. 49,076, 49,082 (Dec. 5, 1988) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a) (1)).
I See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (April 20, 1989).
See53 Fed. Reg. 48,884, 48,885 (Dec. 2, 1988) (codified at 20 C.F.R § 639.3(a) (1)).
'9' See, e.g., Earle v. Commonwealth, 63 N.E. 10, 10 (Mass. Sup.Jud. Ct. 1902); Connor v.
Univ. Park, 142 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1940).
"
See, e.g., Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 761
(D.N.J. 1941) ("commercial or industrial establishment or enterprise"); Atlas Mobilfone, Inc.
v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 939 S.W.2d 928, 933-34 (Mo. CL App. 1997) ("The
term 'business' means a commercial or industrial enterprise.").
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4601(7)(B) (1994) ("any lawful activity, excepting a farm
operation, conducted primarily... for the sale of services to the public"); 25 U.S.CA
§ 4302(5) (2001) ("an entity organized for the conduct of trade or commerce"); FED. R
EVID. 803(6) ("'business'... includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit"); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.65.260(f) (1) (Michie 2000) ("a person or a for profit or a nonprofit entity engaged in a
trade, service, profession, or activity with the goal of receiving a financial benefit in exchange
for the provision of services, goods, or other property"); ALASKA STAT. § 10.35.500(1) (Michie
2000) ("any commercial or industrial enterprise"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.5002(1) (West
"

SSee
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comment either in committee 96 or on the floor of Congress.'9 7
Looking at the use of the term in other statutes, 19 as well as the
limited comments provided by Congress, one can reasonably
conclude that Congress intended to convey two ideas by use of the
term. First, that the legal form of the business (whether sole
proprietorship, corporation, partnership, association, or other
organization) was irrelevant for purposes of the WARN Act.
Second, that the entities subject to the WARN Act must be engaged
in "business." Although the committee reports on earlier versions
of plant closing laws suggested that this term was intended to
exclude governmental employers and include non-profit
organizationsY9 the conference report on the bill that became the
WARN Act contains no such direction. Instead, the conference
report focused on whether the entity had "one or more sites of
employment," 0 that is, whether the entity was an employer in the
" The committee report on H.R. 1616, 99th Cong. (1985), H.R. REP. No. 99-336, at 12
(1985), seems to equate the term "business enterprise" with the term "business." In discussing
the provisions of the bill, the committee report suggests the bill imposes requirements "on a
business employing 50 or more employees." Id. In its section-by-section analysis, the
committee indicated that the definition of "employer" (i.e., "any business enterprise that
employs 50 or more employees") "excludes governmental entities and wholly owned
governmental corporations but includes non-profit employers." Id. at 22. Exactly the same
exclusion was specified by the House Committee on Education and Labor in its section-bysection analysis of the definition of "employer" in H.R. 1122, 100th Cong. (1987), H.R. REP.
No. 100-285, at 44 (1987). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources provided
no comment on the meaning of "employer" in its report on S. 538, 100th Cong. (1988), S.
REP. No. 100-62 (1987). However, the conference report on House Bill 3 provided brief
commentary on the definition, stating, "The Conferees intend that a 'business enterprise' be
deemed synonymous with the terms company, firm or business, and that it consist of one or
more sites of employment under common ownership or control." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100576, at 1046 (1988).
"' The only substantive discussion of the term "business enterprise" came in remarks of
Representative DeLay opposing the passage of H.R. 1616, 98th Cong. (1985) in which he said
that the term "includes private sector employers including railroads and airlines and,
presumably, state and local governments, and even the Federal Government itself, at least
when they are engaged in 'any business enterprise'." 131 CONG. REc. H9628 (daily ed. Nov. 1,
1985).
'" See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 3102(6) (1994) ("'business enterprise' means any organization,
association, branch, or venture which exists for profit making purposes or to othenvise secure
economic advantage, and any ownership of any real estate"); 42 U.S.C. § 7141 (f) (2) (1994)
("a firm, corporation, association, or partnership"); Ethics in Government, § 102, 5 U.S.C.A.
App. 4 § 102(a) (6) (A) (1994) ("any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, any nonprofit organization, any labor organization, or any educational or
other institution other than the United States").
17
See supranote 196.
"'

Id.
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normal sense of the word. Congress could not, of course, use the
word "employer" instead of "business enterprise" because it was
creating a definition of "employer" to include only those entities
with 100 or more employees.2 1'

But there is no indication in the

statute or the conference report or any floor discussions on the bill
that the term "business enterprise" was intended to be exclusive
rather than inclusive, that it was intended to mean something other
than an entity of whatever type that has employees. There is
nothing in the WARN Act itself or its legislative history that supports
the conclusion of the Department that a liquidating fiduciary (or a
bankrupt employer engaged in a liquidation) is not a "business
enterprise" subject to the WARN Act if it has the requisite number
of employees. In the absence of a statutory exclusion, the language
should be read to include liquidating employers unless such a
reading would defeat the intention of the drafters. °2
B. Should BankruptEntities be Subject to the WARIAct?
Although Congress never explicitly (by statutory language) or
implicitly (by legislative history) excluded liquidating fiduciaries or
any other bankrupt employers from the operation of the WARN Act,
the question remains whether it meant to do so. Although three
arguments can be made that the WARN Act should not be
applicable in bankruptcy, ultimately these arguments are
unconvincing and the justifications for making the WARN Act
applicable to bankrupt employers without distinction between those
engaged in liquidation and those undergoing reorganization are
compelling.

"
A definition that uses the defined term is circular. See, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (definition of "employee"); Shultz v. La. Trailer Sales,
Inc., 428 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1970) (definition of "mechanic"); Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank
in Plant City, Fla., 400 F.2d 548, 555 (5th Cir. 1968) (description of term "branch").
'
See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) ("The plain
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.' ... In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language,
controls.") (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,571 (1982)).
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Who's in Charge?

The first reason one might offer for excluding bankrupt
companies from the requirements of the WARN Act is that a
bankrupt employer does not have the same degree of autonomy
over employment decisions as an employer outside of bankruptcy.
The operative section of the WARN Act provides that "[a]n
employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff' without the
required notice.203 Perhaps most plant closings and mass layoffs in
bankruptcy occur not by order of the bankrupt employer but by
order of a third party, whether that party is the trustee or the court,
and therefore a literal reading of the statute excludes all such
actions occurring in bankruptcy.
The Department commentary emphasized that "neither the
[Federal Home Loan Bank] Board nor the [Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation], which are exercising strictly
governmental authority in ordering the closing [of an insolvent
bank or savings and loan association], are to be considered as
employers."2 ° Courts have agreed,2 ° even when the government,
acting through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, does
not close the financial institution completely but instead operates a
transition bridge bank prior to terminating some of the
employees.0 6
On the other hand, when the employer orders employment
terminations, even when necessitated by third party action, 7 the
See29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,045 (Apr. 20, 1989).
See, e.g., Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union Local v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 138 F.R.D. 325, 327 (D.D.C. 1991).
"0 See Buck v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 75 F.3d 1285, 1292 (8th Cir. 1996). The court's
conclusion is questionable. It demonstrates the same "employer"/employer representative
problem discussed in Part Ill.B.1. The court in Buck failed to distinguish between the
employer (the transition bridge bank) and the representative of the employer (the FDIC).
Although the mass layoffs were ordered by the FDIC, the FDIC was acting as the
representative of the employer (the bridge bank) and its governmental capacity should not
have immunized the bridge bank, which was still the employer, from liability to the aggrieved
employees. The court noted that, because the FDIC could have closed the banks without
WARN Act obligations it should have been able to operate the banks for a transitional period
without liability either because that was a "less drastic action." Id. at 1290. On that theory, a
reorganizing bankrupt employer should not have WARN Act obligations because a liquidating
fiduciary does not, and reorganization is a "less drastic action." Id.
"' There is some confusion over whether a plant closing or mass layoff that is ordered by
a government agency or official other than a federal banking agency falls entirely outside the
"
"'
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employer is not relieved of WARN Act obligations. 2° However, in
yet another example of the "employer"/employer representative
problem, courts have suggested that if the third party takes charge
of the day-to-day operations of the business and therefore has
ultimate autonomy over employment decisions, the third party may
become the2 10 "employer" and be subject to the requirements of the
WARN Act.

WARN Act as does a closing by the FDIC or whether it is merely subject to a potential defense
under the "unforeseeable business circumstances" exception. In resisting a proposed
amendment to the bill to exclude from the definition of "employer" any bank or savings and
loan association that was in danger of closure by the FHLBB, Senator Proxmire analogized the
closure of a bank by a federal banking agency to "the police closing down an illegal gambling
operation, or the public health authorities closing down a restaurant violating the health
code, or the sheriff carrying out an eviction. The plant closing provision on its face does not
apply to such situations." 134 CONG. REG. S15,996, 16,046 (daily ed. June 27, 1988). This
would suggest that a closing ordered by the government is not subject to the WARN Act at all.
But Senator Kennedy, in commenting on a hypothetical posed by Senator Reid
regarding the Nevada State Gaming Authority ordering an immediate shutdown of a gaming
operation, stated that "in the case of an agency coming in and ordering an immediate
shutdown with no warning, the employer could not have foreseen such an action" and should
be protected by the unforeseeable business circumstances exception.
The Department, in attempting to reconcile these views in its final rule, declined to
except all government-ordered closings from the WARN Act, suggesting that in some cases
the unforeseeable business circumstances exception might apply. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042,
16,054 (April 20, 1989); (20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b) (1)). However, if "the previous ownership is
ousted from control of the institution" and control is assumed by the government as is the
case with the bank agencies, "there is no employer to give notice" and therefore the WARN
Act does not apply. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,054 (April 20, 1989).
The tension between the two views can be seen by comparing the majority opinion in
Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Assocs., 173 F.3d
175, 182 (3d Cir. 1999), where the court concluded that the closing of a casino by order of the
New Jersey Casino Control Commission was not exempt from the WARN Act but was
protected by the unforeseeable business circumstances exception, and the concurring
opinion in which Judge Alito stated that he would have resolved the case by finding the
WARN Act inapplicable to this government-ordered closing. Id. at 187-88.
M See, e.g., Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 497 (3d Cir. 2001) (lender
controlled employer's stock, installed board of directors and chief executive officer, and later
refused further financing); Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1996)
(lender refused to advance more funds and called defaulted loans); Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Union Loan 572 v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241, 244-45 (9th Cir.
1995) (assets surrendered to secured creditor in satisfaction of delinquent loan). Such a
third-party action may, however, give rise to a defense under the unforeseeable business
circumstances exception. See20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b) (1) (2001).
See supraPart III.B.1.
.. See Pearson, 247 F.3d at 497 ("responsibility must have been for the 'ordinary
operation' of the business"); Erwin Weller, 87 F.3d at 273 (employer-employee relationship
would be demonstrated "by hiring, firing, paying, or supervising" any of the employees);
Weslock, 66 F.3d at 245 (not an employer absent "some evidence showing... involvement in
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Who has that sort of responsibility for the operations of a
bankrupt employer? In a chapter 11 case the answer is generally the
debtor in possession, exercising the powers of the trustee in
bankruptcy."' In all chapter 7 cases, and in chapter 11 cases in
which a trustee has been appointed,212 it is the trustee in bankruptcy.
Perhaps the trustee in bankruptcy (or the debtor in possession
exercising its powers) could be characterized as exercising "strictly
governmental authority" when ordering plant closings or mass
layoffs, akin to the actions taken by the FDIC.
The problem with that argument is that the trustee in
bankruptcy is not a representative of the government. Although the
trustee may be appointed by the United States Trustee (an official of
1
the U.S. Justice Department2e),214
appointed by the bankruptcy
215
judge, or elected by the creditors pursuant to the Code," 6 the
trustee is a private "disinterested person," not a government
official. 7 The trustee is a fiduciary for creditors (which may include
the government, but need not) and for shareholders. 21 s Except in
that capacity, the trustee does not represent the government and, in
fact, is often9 in the position of pursuing actions against the
government.2
Equally troubling is the argument that the employer is relieved
from WARN Act obligations if a court orders a plant closing or mass
layoff. Although no provision of the Code precludes a debtor from
the functional operations" of the business); cf. Local 217 Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Union v. MHM, Inc., 976 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (hotel management firm that
"bargained with, hired, fired, supervised, paid, and ultimately laid off" employees, rather than
bankrupt owner of hotel, was "employer"). See generallyJames E. Clark, ProtectingYour Security
Interest Without Being Held Liable Under the WARN Act, 17 No. 8 BANKR. STRATEGIsr 3 (June

2000).
21

Seell U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000).

Seeid. § 1104(a).
...See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1994).

,1 Seell U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1).
215 See id. § 1104(a).
21
21

See id. §§ 702(b), 1104(b).
Only if no member of the panel of private trustees established under 28 U.S.C.

§ 586(a) (1)

is willing to serve as interim trustee may the U.S. Trustee serve as interim trustee
in a chapter 7 case, see 11 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2) (2000), and only if a trustee is not elected by
creditors does the interim trustee serve as trustee in the case. See id.§ 702(d). Similar
provisions apply with respect to successor trustees. See id.
§ 703.
21
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985).
...The United States government has relinquished its sovereign immunity with respect
to such actions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000).
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terminating any or all of its employees without court approval, in
most situations a decision to engage in such an action will be linked
to another action that clearly does require such approval, such as
the use, sale, or lease of property of the estate other than in the
ordinary business, 220 or the rejection of executory contracts and
unexpired leases,22' or confirmation of a plan of reorganization.222 If
the court approval itself rendered the WARN Act inapplicable, all
plant closings or mass layoffs in bankruptcy would assuredly be
implemented pursuant to court order, and the bankruptcy court
would effectively be given the power to immunize all bankrupt
estates from liability.
Although one bankruptcy judge has
concluded that an employer does not order the plant closing or
mass layoff within the meaning of the WARN Act if it acts pursuant
to order of the bankruptcy court,223 a bankruptcy court224has no power

to relieve a debtor from the obligations of federal law.
A more logical approach to court-ordered plant closings and
mass layoffs in bankruptcy is that followed for employment actions
outside of bankruptcy precipitated by third party action. As
previously discussed,2 as long as the employer (rather than the
third party) actually terminates the employees, even if that action
was necessitated by order of a secured creditor or governmental
agency, the WARN Act should apply. If the court order requires
' See id. § 363(b) (1) (providing that "[tihe trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary business, property of the estate").
2" See id. § 365(a) (providing that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor").
See id. § 1129 (specifying requirements for confirmation by court).
' See In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1994 WL 842777, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1994). The issue was raised in the context of a challenge by the debtor and the union
representing its employees to confirmation of a plan of reorganization proposed by debtor's
principal secured creditors. It was argued that the plan did not comply with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (3) (requiring that the plan be "proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law") because it provided for the business to close without WARN Act
compliance. The court rejected the objection, noting that "[the court] is rendering the final
decision which orders the hotel to close, not the Debtor who is fighting to keep it open," and
therefore the WARN Act notice requirement was not applicable. Id.
'
See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envti. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986) (stating that the trustee may not exercise abandonment power in violation of state and
federal environmental laws); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
534 (1984) (noting that bankruptcy does not relieve debtor of obligations under National
Labor Relations Act); In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 B.R. 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (order
allowing assumption of contract with electric power company could not violate state and
federal laws).
.. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
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closures on a schedule that does not permit sixty days prior notice
to employees, the employer may be able to assert unforeseeable
business circumstances to shorten its notice obligation, 22 6 but the
employer is not relieved of them altogether.
In sum, neither the involvement of the trustee in bankruptcy
for a debtor employer nor the probable involvement of the
bankruptcy court in implementing a decision to order a plant
closing or mass layoff should have any bearing on the liability of the
debtor employer to its aggrieved employees. In all cases it is the
debtor employer who, through its authorized representative (either
the trustee in bankruptcy or the debtor in possession), runs the
business in the sense of hiring, paying, supervising, and firing
employees. And whether or not those actions are approved by the
bankruptcy court, the estate of the debtor employer should bear the
burden of liabilities imposed by compliance with federal law in
taking those actions.
2. Notice in Bankruptcy
The sole purpose behind the WARN Act is to provide
employees of business enterprises that qualify as "employers" under
its provisions prior notice of a potential action by their employer
that would put them out of work.227 With such notice, it was
thought, not only could they have time to seek alternative
employment but the local municipal and state authorities could
launch social programs to maximize the possibility of a "soft
landing" for the terminated employees. 228 A second justification that
might be offered for finding bankrupt employers exempt from the
WARN Act requirements is that WARN Act notice may not be
necessary for employees of such employers because the bankruptcy
process ensures that they (as well as the state and local officials)
' Of course, under 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (b) (2) (1994), the employer may give less than
sixty days notice only if the business circumstances causing the mass layoff or plant closing
were not "reasonably foreseeable" 60 days prior to the action', and even then the employer
must give "as much notice as is practicable." Id. § 2102(b) (3). The employment terminations
must be reasonably foreseeable at least from the time application is made to the bankruptcy
court for approval for the actions.
See, e.g., Halkdas v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 955 F. Supp. 695, 698 (N.D. Tex. 1997), af/'d,
137 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1998); Grimmer v. Lord Day & Lord, 937 F. Supp. 255, 256 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
"
See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,059-61 (Apr. 20, 1989) (discussing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 639.7(b)-(f)).
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receive notice of potential plant closings and mass layoffs in other
ways.
The first way employees receive notice that may, it could be
argued, obviate any need for WARN Act notice is by the notice they
receive of the bankruptcy filing itself. Perhaps the very fact that the
employer has taken this legal step to protect itself from its creditors
should alert employees to the possibility, if not the likelihood, that
their jobs could be terminated. There are two obvious responses to
this argument. First, if the filing is made under chapter 11, there is
no reason to believe at the time of filing that any particular jobs will
be lost because the debtor employer may choose to reorganize the
business and retain many or all of its operations. Even if the
employer files under chapter 7, the trustee may choose to liquidate
the business by selling it as a going concern, which may not result in
any loss of jobs. Second, even if it is clear to the trustee and the
more sophisticated creditors that a new chapter 7 debtor will
liquidate by selling assets, it is unreasonable to expect that the
ordinary employee of a bankrupt concern understands the
implications of a chapter 7 filing or the schedule of a liquidation.
The filing of the bankruptcy petition (and any notice given thereof
to the employees as creditors) provides notice of only one thing, the
bankruptcy of the employer. 9
A second point at which employees may receive a notice during
a bankruptcy case that should lead them to believe that their jobs
are insecure is when the employer files a motion to sell, lease, or
otherwise dispose of assets at a particular facility, or seeks to reject
or assume and assign a lease, or files a plan of reorganization that
contemplates a plant closing or mass layoff. Perhaps because
employees of a bankrupt employer receive this type of notice, they
do not need a WARN Act notice to allow them to protect their
interests. But this argument suffers the same deficiencies as the
prior one. How the action described in such a motion will affect any
individual employee's job is uncertain merely from the motion
itself. Employees may be transferred to other positions or hired by
an assignee. And such a motion provides even less definite notice
than a bankruptcy petition filing because it has no legal effect in
itself until and unless it is granted by the court. For all of these
Cf Martin C. Brook, What Happens When the WARN Act and the Bankruptcy Code
Converge?, 24 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 103, 111 (1999) (discussing whether the filing of a chapter 7
petition should be considered an ordered plant closing or mass layoff).
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reasons, a motion relating to a proposed debtor action cannot
substitute for a WARN Act notice.
Even if one could conclude that either the filing of a
bankruptcy petition or a motion to take action by the debtor
requiring court approval provides employees with practical notice of
a possible job loss, such de facto notice would not qualify as legal
notice under the WARN Act. Although the WARN Act itself does
not describe the notice that must be delivered by an employer prior
to a plant closing or mass layoff in any detail,2 0 it does say that the
employer "shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff" until sixty
days after giving written notice "of such an order., 23 Neither the
bankruptcy petition, nor any motion filed by the employer during
the course of the bankruptcy case, can be described as a notice of an
ordered plant closing or mass layoff unless it is itself a WARN Act
notice. The Department rule goes even further, specifying in some
detail the required contents of a WARN Act notice. 2 Employees of
bankrupt employers receive nothing comparable and are entitled to
nothing less.
3. Bankruptcy Operation
A final argument in favor of excluding bankrupt companies
from the operation of the WARN Act might be that Congress could
never have intended the WARN Act to apply in this context.
Congress never addressed the situation in the legislation itself or in
the legislative history, the statutory provisions do not mesh well with
the operation of a bankruptcy case, and the penalty afforded
aggrieved employees undermines the carefully constructed statutory
priority scheme for claimants in bankruptcy by giving employees a
"secret" priority claim to which they are not entitled. This argument
too, is unconvincing.
Congress certainly did not discuss the application of the WARN
Act to companies seeking the protection of the Code. Indeed, the
only discussion of bankruptcy during the Congressional debates was

.. The Department acknowledged this fact in its preamble to the final rule, but
defended its decision to provide detailed notice requirements to meet the need to provide
employees and public officials "information necessary for each of them to take responsible
action." 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,059 (Apr. 20, 1989).
2" 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
See20 C.F.R. § 639.7 (2001).
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the argument of opponents of the proposed statute that its
enactment would force more companies into bankruptcy because
the mandatory prenotification would scare off creditors and
suppliers to the affected employer.ss
On the other hand, there is no explicit exclusion for bankrupt
employers included in the WARN Act, despite considerable focus on
companies that were financially troubled in connection with the
inclusion of the "faltering company" exception. 2 3 As a matter of
WARN Act policy, there is no reason to distinguish between an
employer who is in bankruptcy and one who is not; the aggrieved
employees are still being terminated and have the same need for
notice in order to give them time to seek new jobs and adjust to
their changed circumstances, and the local authorities still have the
same concerns about the loss ofjobs in their communities. Indeed,
several of the specific examples cited by members of Congress
speaking in support of plant closing bills over the years involved
closings occasioned by bankruptcy."5 If providing prenotification
outside of bankruptcy is likely to reduce the time of unemployment
for those affected employees, " ' thereby saving tax dollars in the
form of unemployment compensation, food stamps, welfare
payments, and lost income taxes, and increasing productivity, those
results are equally likely to be true for prenotification by bankrupt
employers. A terminated employee is equally out of ajob whether
the employer doing the firing is in bankruptcy or not. Congress
provided no indication that one terminated employee should be
entitled to less protection than the other.
There is also no doubt that the WARN Act operates a bit
differently in bankruptcy in the sense that a person seeking to
2"

See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. H31,399 (Nov. 12, 1985) (statement of Rep.Jeffords).

See supratext accompanying notes 44-46.
.. See 131 CONG. REC. H9994-5 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1985) (statement of Rep. Conte)
(discussing X-Tyal International Corp.); 131 CONG. REc. H10,468 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1985)
(statement of Rep. Lundine) (discussing Art Metal-USA, Inc.).
"- Various studies have suggested that early warning of plant closings is an essential part
of an effective adjustment assistance program. See, e.g., U.S. Secretary of Labor's Task Force
on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation, Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation
in a Competitive Society 22-23 (Dec. 1986); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Plant Closing. Advance Notice and RapidResponse--Special Report, OTA-ITE-321 1-2 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 1986); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Technology and Structural Unemployment: Reemploying DisplacedAdults, OTA-ITE-250
19 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb. 1986). See also H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 100-576, at 1045 (1988).
"4
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enforce the liability of a bankrupt employer who fails to provide the
required prenotification cannot enforce that liability against
property of the estate because such an action would be barred by
the automatic stay.2 s7 Instead, the party to whom liability is owed will
be entitled to a claim in the bankruptcy case which, as previously
discussed, will be a first priority administrative expense claim238 and
will be paid when and to the extent that other claims of similar
priority are paid. But other rights to payment created by contract3 9
or by law240 are also transformed into bankruptcy claims, and that
transfiguration does not render the contract or statute pursuant to
which the rights arise inapplicable to bankrupt parties.
Although the provisions of the WARN Act were not drafted with
the bankrupt employer in mind, they can be applied to the
bankrupt employer without difficulty.
A bankrupt employer
(through its authorized representative, whether trustee in
bankruptcy or as debtor in possession) is capable of providing the
required prenotification of a proposed plant closing or mass
layoff.24'

The qualification to the term "employment loss" that

excludes a plant closing or mass layoff when employees are offered
transfers to nearby facilities242 can also operate in bankruptcy
without modification. The provisions permitting reduction of the
mandatory sixty-day period of notice can also be applied in
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (3) (2000) (barring "any act to obtain possession of property of
the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate").
An action to establish the liability of a bankrupt employer for failure to provide WARN Act
notice would not be barred by the automatic stay because the stay does not prevent suits
against a debtor with respect to claims that arise postpetition. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Parks, 830
F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Food City, Inc., 95 B.R. 451, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1988); In re Vacuum Cleaner Corp. of America, 14 B.R. 135, (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re
Knight, 7 B.R. 505, (Bankr. D. Md. 1981). However, the court has the power to stay such suits
under 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) as "may be necessary to the ends ofjustice." Jaytee-Penndel Co. v.
Bloor (In re Investors Funding Corp.), 547 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1976); In reTelevision Studio
School of New York, 77 B.R. 411,412 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
23 See supra text accompanying notes 167-82.
. These include postpetition rent expenses, wage claims, insurance premiums, utility
payments, payments to suppliers, among other payments obligations. All would be considered
administrative expense claims under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (2000).
20
The most obvious legal payment obligation is the duty to pay taxes. Bankruptcy
estates are taxable entities and postpetition taxes are entitled to administrative expense
priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b) (1) (B) (i) (defining administrative expenses to include "any tax
incurred by the estate ....
"). See, e.g., United States v. Friendship College Inc., 737 F.2d 430
(4th Cir. 1984).
'" See29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1994).
242

Id.

§

2101(b) (2).
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bankruptcy. For example, the "faltering company" exception allows
an employer to shut down a single site of employment earlier than
sixty days after notice is given if "the employer was actively seeking
capital or business which, if obtained, would have enabled the
employer to avoid or postpone the shutdown and the employer
reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the notice
required would have precluded the employer from obtaining the
needed

capital or business."2

43

Many actions by a bankrupt

employer, such as the search for postpetition trade credit, requests
for debtor-in-possession financing, or even negotiating to
structuring a plan of reorganization that contemplates debt
concessions and new money infusions, can be characterized as
"actively seeking business or capital."2 44 Unforeseen business
circumstances (such as dramatic changes in market conditions) that
permit reduction in the sixty day notice period 245 and natural
disasters which excuse the giving of prior notice246 are equally
applicable to bankrupt entities as those financially healthy. And the
2 47
blanket exceptions for temporary projects and strikes or lockouts
could also be invoked by bankrupt employers.
The final argument against the applicability of the WARN Act
to bankrupt employers is that the priority of employee wage claims
are specifically addressed in the Code,24 s and applying the WARN
Act in bankruptcy simply creates a "secret" priority claim that
Congress never intended to provide. Allowing employees to recover
on this claim in bankruptcy simply reallocates amounts that would
otherwise be paid to unsecured creditors, making it less likely that
they will obtain a reasonable recovery on their claims. And because
''
2"

Id. § 2102(b) (1).
See, e.g., In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1994 WL 842777, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

1994).
2

See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2) (A) (1994).

The debtor's precarious financial condition

itself should not constitute "unforeseeable business circumstances" because a company should
be aware of its own financial condition. See In re Riker Industries, Inc., 151 B.R. 823, 827
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
246 See29 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (2) (B) (1994).
2" Seeid. §§ 2103(1) and (2).
2's Prepetition wage claims of employees are treated as third priority claims to the extent
of $4,300 for each individual or corporation earned within ninety days before the date of the
filing of the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (3) (2000). The $4,300 figure was automatically
adjusted on April 1, 2001 to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index since April 1, 1998.
See id. § 104(b). Postpetition wages are treated as first priority administrative expense claims
under id. §§ 507(a) (1) and 503(b) (1) (A).
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holders of administrative expense claims must be paid in cash the
allowed amount of those claims on the effective date of a plan of
249
reorganization,
increasing administrative expense claims by
WARN Act liability simply makes successful reorganizations less
feasible.2 50
There are three responses to these points. First, there is
nothing "secret" about the liability imposed on employers who
violate the WARN Act. Although the WARN Act claims are not
specifically itemized among priority claims in the Code, as
previously discussed WARN Act liability has been analogized to wage
claims the priority of which is specifically addressed in the Code,
both for wages earned prepetition and those earned during the
bankruptcy case.2"' Second, because WARN Act liability attaches
only if the bankrupt employer fails to give the required notice, the
aggrieved employees have no greater claim (or any higher priority
for that claim) than they would have received had the notice been
given and they had been allowed to earn their regular wages for the
sixty-day period. Those wage claims always are afforded first priority
administrative expense status and come before unsecured creditors.
If the size of administrative expense claims makes reorganization
unlikely, there is no reason to single out WARN Act claims as the
culprits. Finally, the WARN Act explicitly provides that "[t] he rights
and remedies provided to employees by this chapter are in addition
to, and not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and
remedies of the employees, and are not intended to alter or affect
such rights and remedies."2 ' 2 Therefore, even if the WARN Act
provided claims to employees against their employers that
supplemented those provided by the Code, Congress did not intend
to supplant any rights employees were given under other laws when
it enacted the WARN Act.

2,9

Id. § 1129(a) (9) (A).

The holder of an administrative expense claim can agree to

different treatment of the claim. Id.
' See Robert M. Fishman & Brian L. Shaw, Dealing with the Legal Overlap of a Bankruptcy
Case and Employment Law, 18 BANKR. STRATEGIsT 4 (Feb. 2001).
25' See id.
2

See29 U.S.C.

§ 2105

(1994).
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CONCLUSION

The WARN Act was in many ways a modest piece of
legislation.5 s But for those employees affected by a plant closing or
mass layoff, the limited notice the WARN Act requires provides a
modicum of financial and emotional security at a time of extreme
stress.
The Department rule and analysis, which apparently exempts
from liability under the WARN Act bankrupt employers who order
plant closings and mass layoffs through the trustee in bankruptcy in
a chapter 7 case or through the debtor in possession in a liquidating
chapter 11 case, deny employees even that limited safety net. For
the employee of the bankrupt company, the distinction between a
liquidating employer and a reorganizing employer has no meaning.
Employees of both types of bankrupt employers are equally
concerned about their jobs, equally subject to financial hardship
and mental and physical strain when they lose their paychecks, and
equally in need of the limited protections the WARN Act affords.
More fundamentally, the Department approach treats
employees of bankrupt companies as if they were different fromand entitled to less protection than-those of companies that are
not in bankruptcy. The employee who is fired one day before a
bankruptcy filing is entitled to the full protection of the WARN Act
while an employee of the same company who is fired one day after
bankruptcy is not. Such disparate treatment is not dictated by the
language of the WARN Act and has no principled basis either in
WARN Act policy or in that underlying the Code."4 Indeed, one
could argue that the Code evinces a consistent policy of protecting
the rights of employees over those of other creditors and against the
debtor itself.255

Uniform treatment between those employees of

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 588 n.46
(1998) (WARN Act's "scope was quite modest").
See Martin C. Brook. Wat Happens When the WARN Act and the Bankruptcy Code
Converge?, 24 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 103, 119 (1999) (suggesting that the distinction "has the
effect of discouraging WARN compliance because an unscrupulous or negligent employer can
fail to give notice and leave it to the appointed Trustee to close the business and lay off the
employees with no WARN obligation or liability").
' See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) (1) (A) (2000) (making wages, salaries, or commissions
for services rendered after commencement of the case administrative expense claims);
507(a) (1) (assigning first priority to administrative expense claims); § 507(a) (3) (assigning
third priority to certain unsecured claims for wages, salaries, commissions and related
liabilities earned within 90 days before the filing of the petition); § 507(a)(4) (assigning
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liquidating and reorganizing bankrupts and between bankrupt
employers and non-bankrupt employers is mandated not only by the
language of the WARN Act but by the basic sense of justice that
motivated Congress after so many years and such a difficult political
struggle to enact it. The Department erred in creating distinctions
without a difference.
Congress should correct that error by
providing clearly and without equivocation that the WARN Act
means what it says and that all employees--even those of liquidating
bankrupt employers-are entitled to share in its benefits.

fourth priority to claims for certain unsecured claims for contributions to employee benefit
plans); § 1113 (limiting ability of debtor to reject collective bargaining agreements); § 1114
(limiting ability of debtor to modify or terminate payment of retiree benefits).
Some have suggested that the Code has not gone far enough to protect the rights of
employees and that additional mechanisms to facilitate their participation in bankruptcy cases
should be instituted. For example, it has been suggested that the Official Bankruptcy Forms
should be amended to include additional information about employment-related debts,
including WARN Act claims. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY:
THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs 502-03 (Oct. 20, 1997) (statement of Comm'r Babette Ceccotti).
Other suggestions include encouraging participation by employees and unions in the official
creditors' committee, id. at 503-05, and formation of an official employees' committee, id. at
505-06. It has also been suggested that employees should have automatic standing in
bankruptcy cases to be heard on issues affecting their future employment. See Nathalie D.
Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the OutsideLooking In, 59 OHIO ST. LJ.
429,477-80 (1998).

